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between the PSD activities of bilateral and multilateral development agencies. In so
doing it asks whether agencies’ apparent reliance on the same analytical source extends
to the use of the same type of instruments. It also examines how far the latter are
consistent with donors’ broader development objectives and development assistance
norms. It then asks what do the findings reached in this regard imply for aid coherence,
coordination and inter-donor competition. Next, the paper provides an overview of
discussions around the effectiveness of the numerous PSD instruments. It concludes
with a provisional summing-up of the extent to which bilaterals and multilaterals differ,
and of why this might be the case
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1 Introduction
In the minds of a large majority of development thinkers and agencies, there is no
longer any doubt that the private sector is the real ‘engine of growth’, the motor that
will lead to economic progress and thereby to poverty reduction. On the other hand, the
lack of conceptualization and, certainly, operationalization of the poverty reduction
objective is a major problem for the development cooperation policies of the donors.
This is of particular importance when looking at those interventions and programmes
which seem at best to be tackling only one dimension of poverty reduction, such as
those falling under the rubric of private sector development (PSD).
According to the DAC (1994: 4), this is less of a problem than it might seem. For this
organization, private sector development is itself related to poverty reduction in a
multifaceted way. First, it contributes to growth, and creates employment and income
leading ‘to a more equitable diffusion of the benefits of growth to more people’.
Furthermore, in the case of micro-enterprises ‘these factors are […] enhanced by virtue
of their particularly direct impact on poverty reduction and on the integration of women
and other marginalized segments of society into economic life’. Second, PSD
contributes to the political aspects of poverty reduction because it promotes
participatory development and good governance, by engaging ‘people more actively in
the productive and decision-making processes that affect their lives’. The development
of the private sector is even seen as contributing to a more pluralistic civil society ‘that
can lead to more accountable political systems and rising labour standards’. Finally,
certain aspects of PSD, in particular privatization, address the social dimension of
poverty reduction. They do so because they imply more efficient use of resources and
thus create possibilities to divert funds from loss-making public enterprises to such
laudable causes as education and health. These consequences do not follow
automatically though. Rather, whether they follow or not, is dependent on good
governance and good policies.
Similar claims for multifaceted links between PSD and poverty reduction are made by
the World Bank (2002). It is debatable whether these arguments for multiple but largely
indirect links compensate for the absence of both a clearer definition of poverty
reduction itself, and of a stronger demonstration of a direct link between PSD and the
latter.1 Notwithstanding this, the statements reported above show that donors now
consider it not only worthwhile but also necessary to assist developing countries’
private sectors so as to encourage their growth and improve their performance. Of
course, most development agencies (from bilateral donors to regional development
banks) have always had some focus on the private sector, but it was only in the 1990s
and in the context of a broader development consensus of a new kind that something
termed ‘private sector development’ became the catchword.
This paper identifies the rationale behind these developments, describes the main
elements and instruments of the PSD policies, and provides an overview of the
differences and similarities between the PSD activities of bilateral and multilateral
development agencies. In so doing, it asks whether agencies’ reliance on the same
analytical source extends to the use of the same type of instruments. The paper also
                                                
1 Many (particularly bilateral) donor formulate the link between PSD and poverty reduction in terms of
the notion of ‘pro-poor growth’. This formulation tends to simply beg the question in a slightly
different form.2
examines how far the latter are consistent with donors’ broader development objectives
and development assistance norms. It then asks what the findings reached in this regard
imply for aid coherence, coordination and inter-donor competition. Next, the paper
provides an overview of discussions around the effectiveness of the numerous PSD
instruments. It concludes with a provisional summary of the extent to which bilaterals
and multilaterals differ, and why this might be the case.
2 The content of PSD
The increasing focus of bilateral and multilateral organizations on the private sector was
a logical outcome of the reorientation in development thinking that began in the 1980s.
The first stage of this reorientation was a shift from the belief of the state being the
prime mover of economic development to the neoliberal resurgence of the early 1980s
when the state was regarded with ‘major disillusionment’ (Killick 1989: 9) and
privatization and structural adjustment were seen as the solution to a broad range of
problems. A more nuanced view emerged during the 1990s, when a synthesis of public
and private initiative became recognized as the way forward. Together with the end of
the cold war, therefore, came an end of the ‘ideological cleavage’ in development
thinking and the emergence of the present-day consensus on the role of the private
sector in development and on PSD as a policy objective.
This consensus acknowledges complementary roles for the state and the private sector,
in which the latter generates economic growth and the former ensures that the private
sector is able to fulfil its role while at the same time making sure that growth contributes
to poverty reduction, does not lead to environmental degradation and pays attention to
gender equality. The paradigmatic status of this view dates from the 1991 World Bank
World Development Report which argued that while the role of private firms and
markets was to produce and distribute goods and services in an efficient manner,
government was needed in order to provide a legal and regulatory framework (including
strengthened property rights), macroeconomic stability, investments in infrastructure
and essential services for the poor. A decade later, World Development Report 2003
(World Bank 2002: i, 183) still takes this point of departure, albeit with an increased
emphasis on the importance of non-market institutions. These institutions, which may
be government or non-government, are now also considered necessary for supplying
environmental and social assets.
What is perhaps most striking about the consensus is that it still pays much more
attention to (re-)defining the role of the government than it does to the nature of the
private sector and the effects of its development. Agencies depart from the notion that,
in the long run, the private sector will deliver equitable growth spontaneously—
provided that an enabling environment is present. In practice, therefore, policy
discussion of suitable interventions has been confined to how the government can be
directed to create this enabling environment. At the same time, many practical PSD
interventions by donors are aimed directly at the private sector, but in ways that lack
detailed policy justification.
Intellectually, the consensus can be interpreted as distinguishing two basic levels of PSD,
the second of which is sub-divided into three sub-levels. Each comprises a different group
of parameters in which specific private sectors operate, whose regulation may act as a3
stimulus to or constraint on PSD. To this extent, designing and coordinating policies
addressed to all four levels can be considered a prerequisite for the coherence of donor
activity in this field.2 At the first, international level, these parameters include effective
participation in international trade. This entails participation in the WTO. However, in
regard to the WTO, incoherence is still the order of the day, since donor countries’
enthusiasm for the recipients to conform to WTO agreements is not usually matched by
an equal willingness for opening up from their own side. At the second, national level, a
distinction can be made between macro-level parameters such as macroeconomic policy,
physical infrastructure, human capital formation and good governance; a meso-level
includes the presence of institutions such as employers’ organizations, labour unions, and
training institutions; and a micro-  or firm-level includes access to capital/credit,
technology, labour, and market information.
Specific types of intervention may be identified within each of these levels of PSD,
ranging from advocacy on behalf of developing countries in international fora to direct
support to private firms. Table 1 provides a summary of the content of these levels, and of
some related actual and proposed instruments. Corresponding to the distinctions between
these levels, some of the latter are directed at the international community, some to
assisting governments in developing countries, some to assisting governments together
with other ‘partners’ in society, and some at individual enterprises in developing
countries. Those directed at the international community include action to reduce tied aid
and increase donor coordination. Generally, interventions tend to become more specific,
and more in the form of targeted technical and financial support,3 the further one moves
down from the international to the micro-level.
Probably because the parameters recognized in the consensus are so many, and the
resources of individual donors are few, most concentrate interventions at only one or two
levels. The choices this involves tend to reflect the different degrees of attention paid in
broader policy discourses to the behaviours of developing country governments and the
international community, respectively. While it is arguably more rational for donors to
assume that these are of equal importance, selection of instruments is in practice
influenced by the belief that ‘external factors [are] invariably less significant than internal
policies and practices’ (DAC 1999: 3). Therefore the instruments chosen are those
addressing national macro-, meso- and micro-levels.
There may also be a problem with some of the assumptions governing how specific
instruments are devised to address issues at these levels. Many of these reflect a highly
normative conception of what a ‘national enabling environment’ should look like,
reflecting an idealized model of such environments in the north. The result is a form of
‘one size fits all’ thinking that fails to take its point of departure in the realities of the
south. Only within this somewhat narrow framework is it possible to identify meaningful
differences between donors on issues addressed and instruments chosen. Nonetheless,
some important differences are present, which are examined in the following section.
                                                
2 Coherence refers to ‘the consistency of policy objectives and instruments applied by OECD
governments, individually and collectively, in the light of their combined effects on developing
countries’ (DAC Informal Network on Poverty Reduction 2000).
3 Instruments in the field of international negotiation can also be in the form of targeted technical
support, as in the case of programmes to enhance developing countries’ trade negotiation capacity.4
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•   Free and rule-governed
international trade
•   Access to international
markets
•   Debt reduction
•   Donor policies and
practices (including
coordination)
•   Lobby and advocacy on behalf of poor countries in multilateral
fora such as World Bank, WTO, IMF; with the EU and member
states to open up the European market; with the MAI; with donor
countries to promote coherence in foreign policies (particularly in
relation to aid policies);
•   Increase trade with southern countries (e.g., through tariff
reductions, exemption schemes, or providing (technical)
assistance and knowledge on northern markets to southern
exporters);
•   Set up bilateral investment treaties with poor countries regulating
foreign direct investments;
•   Set up a coherent PSD policy within the overall development
policy by donors;







•   Trade policy
•   Privatization
•   Exchange rate, monetary,
labour market and fiscal
policies
•   Inflation reduction
•   Financial institutions
(capital market)




•   Education and skill
training
•   Health
•   Roads, railways,
telecommunication, etc.
•   Social security and
pension schemes
Good governance
•   Fight against corruption
•   Transparency
•   Legal system
•   Competition policy
•   Corporate governance
•   Strengthen economic and industrial policy of developing
countries through technical assistance, training and exposure;
•   Support economic reform programmes while paying attention to
sequencing and timing;
•   Support debt relief measures and provide bilateral debt relief
assistance;
•   Improve (physical) infrastructure (roads, railways, telephones,
harbours);
•   Provide technical and financial assistance to improve the human
capital situation in poor countries (including such issues as skill
training, education, health);
•   Provide technical assistance in the fields of labour laws and
pension funds;
•   Provide assistance in the field of policymaking, transparency of
governments, the fight against corruption;






•   Chamber of commerce
•   Employers organization
•   Labour unions
•   Intermediary financial
institutions
•   R&D institutions
•   Training institutions
•   Strengthen the institutional framework through increased
cooperation between northern labour unions, employers;
organizations and chambers of commerce and their southern
counterparts through funding, training, exposure;
•   Provide training to sensitize social partners (labour and
employers organizations, civil society and the government) to
work together;
•   Institutional development through training, exposure;
•   Increased coordination between donors.
                                                                        Table 1 continues5
Table 1 (con’t)






•   Access to technology,
expertise and capital
•   Manpower
•   Management and
entrepreneurship
•   Market access and
information
•   Support to enterprises through, for instance, transfer of
technology, training and competence building (e.g., in the fields
of marketing or export), financing, supervision;
•   Support for improving access to financing by micro credit
schemes of governments and NGOs, providing risk capital, loan
schemes, guarantee schemes and local investment funds to the
private sector;
•   Support for local market improvements, storage systems and
marketing knowledge;
•   Provide assistance to increase agricultural production as a base
for economic growth;
•   Increase local or regional procurement and the use of local or
regional consultants within aid  (including emergency aid)
interventions;
•   Increased coordination between donors.
Source: Adapted from Schulpen and Gibbon (2001: table 1.1 and table 1).
3 Bilateral and multilateral agencies: policies, programmes, instruments
and funding
Having described PSD thinking in general terms, this section sets out to provide a
presentation of the policies and instruments of both bilateral and multilateral donors.
Not all donors can or will be covered here. Thus, whereas for the discussion on bilateral
donors reference is made particularly to those donors that have formulated explicit PSD
policies, discussion on multilateral donors is restricted to what are probably the major
players (in the PSD field) as far as developing countries are concerned. These include
the World Bank Group (e.g., IFC, MIGA, IBRD/IDA) and the main ‘south’-oriented
regional development banks (IADB, AfDB, AsDB and IsDB). Many (smaller) or less
‘south’-oriented players are omitted, or referred to only in passing. It is expected,
however, that including more (multilateral) organizations would only lead to ‘variations
on the same theme’.
3.1 Bilateral donors
At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new century, several bilateral donors
brought out policy papers dealing directly with PSD. In 1999, for instance, Norway
presented its strategy for the support of the private sector in developing countries
(NORAD 1999), and during the next year Australia (AusAID 2000) and the Netherlands
(DGIS 2000) produced PSD policies. Although Belgium still has no explicit PSD
strategy, recent policy statements clearly emphasize the development of the private
sector as part of development cooperation. In the meantime, Finland is preparing a PSD
policy. The group of bilateral donors with an active policy and specific programmes in
the field of PSD is growing and now comprises Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany,
New Zealand, Norway, the Netherlands, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
Other DAC donors have not yet begun formulating an explicit PSD policy but all have6
to a greater (e.g., Sweden, France, Belgium) or lesser (e.g., Spain, Portugal, Italy,
Ireland) extent programmes aimed at the private sector.
As already suggested, most of the issues addressed by these policies are government-
related in the sense that they refer to tasks and responsibilities that governments have to
perform and implement to prepare for a private sector-led development path (i.e., they
address the role of the government in creating an enabling environment). Furthermore,
in a majority of the cases, they refer to the national rather than the international enabling
environment. This national enabling environment in practically all cases covers
elements described earlier under macro-level, but also quite often meso-level, elements.
Finally, all donors clearly distinguish the enabling environment level from more direct
interventions at the micro-level. Of course, not all donors distinguish explicitly all four
PSD levels or even implicitly acknowledge all levels within their PSD policies. Table 2
shows the levels and central elements distinguished by a selection of bilateral donors.
As far as specific programmes and instruments are concerned, one way of providing a
clearer picture of donor interventions in the field of PSD is to distinguish between
financial and non-financial (or technical) aid4 (Pietilä 2000: 2; also see Jimoh 2002).
Donors provide technical assistance at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels, in the form
of export training, investment advice, provision of experts in managerial roles, etc. Most
bilateral donors are involved in such types of assistance. The same holds for financial
aid instruments such as grants and loans for macro-level activities (e.g., infrastructure),
equity financing, risk capital, guarantees, mixed credits, lines of credit and micro-loan
programmes. Annex 2 provides examples of such instruments for bilateral donors. A
glance at these indicates (potentially) high levels of duplication, indicating that
coordination might pose a major challenge (see below).
Table 2




•   Macroeconomic policy
•   Trade, investment and finance
sector policies
•   Legal and regulatory system
•   Effective public administration
•   Development of civil society
•   Physical and social infrastructure
•   Access to financial market
•   Access to business services
Canada
•   Labour market policies
•   Public sector reform
•   Financial sector reform
•   Trade, investment, and
exchange rate reform
•   Legal and regulatory framework
•   Physical and social infrastructure
•   Competitive internal market
linked to global economy




•   Linkages with Canadian
business
              Table 2 continues
                                                
4  Non-financial aid includes micro-interventions grouped under business development services.7
Table 2 (con’t)




•   Access to international
markets
•   Regulations of international
trade
•   Debt relief
•   ODA levels
•   Macroeconomic policy
•   Good governance
•   Physical and institutional
infrastructure (including the legal
framework)
Covers factors at enterprise level,
e.g.,
•   Access to technology
•   Access to expertise
•   Access to capital
•   Workforce
•   Skills
The Netherlands
•   Trade
•   Investment
•   Debt relief
•   Primary products
•   Coherence of policy
•   Macroeconomic policy
•   Political stability, good
governance and legal system
•   Market development
•   Physical and social infrastructure
•   Protection of men and
environment
A large number of  (bilateral and
multilateral) programmes are
captured here. These are divided
in three fields:
•   Knowledge (e.g., training in
management, investments)
•   Profitability (e.g., financial
support for investments,
exports)
•   Risks (e.g., guarantee
schemes)
Notes:
−   The table only covers the major elements mentioned by the concerned DAC donors in their PSD
policies and is thus not all-inclusive. Moreover, the table does not cover all elements regarded as
important for the development of the private sector in developing countries. Norway represents a
special case here. The table only shows a selection of those policies it states as central. A more
thorough discussion and analysis of these elements is presented in a background paper for
Norway’s PSD policy.
−   The macro- and meso-level, together forming the national enabling environment, are taken together
here, as most donors do not make a distinction between these two levels.
−   Macroeconomic policy in general includes such issues as balanced public budgets, satisfactory
external balances and acceptable rates of inflation and interest.
−   Social infrastructure generally covers health and education, whereas physical infrastructure relates
to  roads, railways, energy, etc. Institutional infrastructure (as in the case of Norway) refers to
‘functioning organizations able to strengthen the dialogue between the business community and the
authorities as well as between the social partners’ (e.g., labour unions, employer organizations and
chambers of commerce).
Sources: AusAID (2000); CIDA (1999); DGIS (2000); EC (1998); NORAD (1999).
3.2 Multilateral donors
The major multilateral players providing PSD assistance in developing countries
comprise international organizations (primarily the World Bank Group) and regional
and quasi-regional organizations with developing countries members (primarily the
various development banks). Members of the UN family of organizations such as
UNCTAD, UNIDO and UNDP also acknowledge the importance of the role of the
private sector in their sector-specific strategies, and provide technical assistance and
‘matchmaking’ services around PSD issues. While they act as intermediaries in
providing financial assistance, they do not normally provide this directly from their own
resources.8
These multilateral organizations began directing assistance to or opening windows for
PSD at rather different times. The World Bank Group has operated one exclusively
private sector window since the 1950s, namely the International Finance Corporation
(IFC), and another since the 1980s (the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
[MIGA]), while at least one of the regional development banks (the Inter-American,
IADB) opened a private sector division (the Inter-American Investment Corporation
[IIC]) in the 1980s. Other development banks opened windows or divisions much
later—the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) with its Business Development
Department in 1995 and the African Development Bank (AfDB) in 1996.5 Some other
development banks still have no dedicated private sector windows, although all lend a
part of their funds to private enterprises. This group includes the Caribbean
Development Bank (CDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). A similar picture exists with regard
to explicit policy discourses around PSD. The World Bank’s first PSD policy was
unveiled in 1987,6 while the AsDB, AfDB and IsDB all have published formal
statements only between 1997 and 2000. The IADB, CBD, EBRD and EIB still have no
such formal policy statements at all.
Here, the policies, programmes and instruments of five multilateral donors are
considered in detail, while the others mentioned above are considered in passing. The
five comprise the World Bank and four regional or quasi-regional development banks
(African, Asian, Inter-American and Islamic). At the time of writing, only three of these
organizations (the World Bank, the Asian and the African Development Banks) had
what might be called fully articulated PSD policies or strategies (that of the IsDB
consists of only a few sentences).
The PSD policies of the three organizations with explicit policies resemble each others’
programmes, and those of the bilateral agencies, to a very great extent (see Table 3). All
fall within the broad boundaries of the ‘PSD consensus’ described earlier. At the same
time, there are some minor differences in emphasis with respect to the way the common
policies are articulated in detail, and the World Bank and the AsDB can be said to have
developed their policies further than the AfDB, in that their policies address areas not
covered by earlier generations of PSD strategy.
Assisting the development of an enabling (business) environment is seen in each case in
terms of a combination of legal and judicial reforms (particularly the elaboration and
enforcement of property rights), continuing internal (competition-related) and external
(trade policy-related) market reform, and taxation system reform. The emphasis of the
AsDB in relation to this issue is somewhat distinct. On the one hand, it highlights labour
market as well as other reforms, while on the other it registers an exception to more
comprehensive proposals for market opening. In its view, governments should retain the
freedom to close the capital account in order to favour longer- over shorter-term
investment flows. In the World Bank’s latest (2002) PSD strategy, the centrality of the
‘enabling environment’ is strongly underlined by the prioritization of ‘investment
environment assessments’ for each recipient country. These assessments are intended to
                                                
5 Although the Islamic Development Bank’s Business Development Department was created in 1995,
lending to the private sector only started to be recorded as a distinct activity in 2000-01, with the
setting up of the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector (ICDPS).
6 The World Bank’s PSD policy has been revised at least twice, in 1995 and 2002.9
be instruments for ‘mainstreaming’ PSD into country assistance strategies, and a
precondition for decisions on the allocation of direct support to private enterprises
between countries.
Reform or privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is again a common
component. In relation to this issue, the policy of the AsDB and the latest policy of the
World Bank are somewhat more nuanced than earlier generations of donor privatization
policies. The AsDB mentions support for types of enterprise reform falling short of
privatization, while the World Bank’s latest statement refers critically to earlier
generations of ‘shock treatment’ privatization and places more emphasis on securing a
supportive market environment than on the volume or pace or privatization.
Direct assistance to private sector firms is another policy shared by this group of
donors. The development banks and the IFC and MIGA wings of the World Bank
emphasize loans, syndications and guarantees for, and equity partnerships in, private
enterprizes of all sizes. Similar sets of limitations and conditions for loans and other
forms of financial assistance are mentioned in each case: direct lending is said to be on
strictly non-concessionary terms7 (but see below) and maximum levels of equity
holding range between 25 per cent and 40 per cent. Direct lending (and technical
support) by the World Bank proper to private firms is said to be aimed primarily at
small and medium enterprizes (SMEs).
Assistance to the financial sector is generally formulated in terms of a combination of
technical assistance and direct lending to financial institutions. Technical assistance is
discussed mainly in relation to issues of regulation, supervision and financial market
development. On-lending by development banks to financial institutions is described as
being targeted both at national banks and at institutions specifically serving SMEs and
micro-enterprises.
Promoting  private participation in infrastructure provision also features in all the
policies considered, with support to ‘build-operate-transfer’ projects being the most
frequently mentioned instrument. The AsDB’s policy strongly emphasizes the
importance of private participation being accompanied by the development of an
adequate regulatory framework.
Table 3






1 Enabling business environment x x x
2 Enterprise reform/privatization x x x
3 Assistance to private sector firms x x x
4 Assisting the financial sector x x x
5 Private participation in infrastructure x x x
6 Corporate governance x x
7 Compliance of actions with development
and/or poverty reduction goals
xx
Sources: World Bank (2002); AsDB (2000); AfDB (1997).
                                                
7 The policy of the ICDPS states that its lending principles are based upon Shara’i Law, with the
implication that its loans are interest free.10
More recent policy development is reflected in two new emphases, found so far only in
the prescriptions of the AsDB and the World Bank. First, these embody proposals to
assist reform of corporate governance. This can be read as an incorporation of some of
the arguments developed by IMF and World Bank economists in relation to the Asian
crisis of 1997-98. According to these arguments (e.g., Iskander et al. 1999; Claessens
1998; World Bank 1998), important causes of the crisis included weak minority
shareholder rights, lack of transparency in corporate financial reporting, interlocking
ownership between the corporate and financial sectors, and dependence of the corporate
sector on bank debt rather than equity financing.8 Policy proposals concern mainly the
first two of these issues.
Second, the PSD policies of the AsDB and World Bank are also relatively distinct in
their reference to the necessity of explicit compliance-based links between PSD
programme design and broader aid objectives. The AsDB states that direct lending to
the private sector will be henceforth conditional on projects having demonstrable
‘development’ implications, and proposes ‘scorecards’ for monitoring these
implications. The World Bank proposes somewhat more detailed conditions for support
to private participation in infrastructure projects, namely that they should include
mechanisms to ensure poor people’s access to services (as well as environmental
sustainability). Whereas these two organizations’ emphasis on corporate governance
issues can be considered an extension of more familiar themes within the PSD policy
discourse, proposing ‘compliance’ mechanisms represents a qualitatively new departure.
Prior to this point, the link between PSD programmes, development and poverty
reduction had been made by donors only in theoretical, rather than direct, terms.
While most multilateral donors that have PSD policies cover a wide range of issues in
them, in practice all those examined here other than the World Bank, concentrate
essentially on direct financial support to the private sector rather than more general
lending for PSD (including to governments). In the development bank realm, the
substantive presence of specific programmes aimed at improving the business
environment, enterprise reform/privatization and modifying corporate governance is
low. Where they are present, they generally take the form of technical-assistance
programmes concerned with training/capacity building, commissioning transaction
designs and undertaking feasibility studies.
Programmes or (much more commonly) programme components around business
environment, enterprise reform and corporate governance issues are very common in
World Bank lending, however. According to the latest World Bank (2002: 26) strategy
document, around 100 PSD conditionalities of these kinds were included in new
adjustment loans each year between 1996 and 1999 (see Table 4). The main trend in
their internal distribution was away from public enterprise reform/privatization
(presumably reflecting a reduction in possible targets for this) and towards private
participation in infrastructure and ‘corporate governance’, particularly in the wake of
the Asian crisis.
Independently of its adjustment lending, the World Bank has also run a substantial
number of technical assistance programmes related to business environment reform,
                                                
8 Basically these ‘causes’ can be read as a summary of the unique features of the Asian corporate
governance model in relation to an idealized account of the Anglo-Saxon one. For a critical
discussion, see Dore (2000).11
privatization, private participation in infrastructure, etc. On the last of these, the most
important such programme is the ‘public-private infrastructure advisory facility’, which
funded 75 activities between 1998 and 2000 at a cost of US$ 15 million, US$ 8 million
of which went to IDA countries (World Bank 2001c: 21).
Although the World Bank’s reporting terminology is somewhat confusing, it
nonetheless appears that—even in the World Bank Group—lending to the private sector
(mainly through IFC) overtook adjustment loan-based and technical assistance-related
PSD lending combined during the 1990s. By 2000, IFC alone accounted for 56 per cent
of total PSD-related lending (ibid.).9 The central element of any survey of multilaterals’
PSD programmes should, therefore, be that of their direct lending to the private sector.
The principal multilateral programmes falling under this heading are listed in Table 5.
In addition, Table 6 provides an overview of bilateral (ODA and OOF) equity
investments and total IFC funding, and compares these with total foreign direct
investments and total private capital flows. This table shows that total bilateral equity
investment (taken here as a form of direct financial support for PSD) is only a fraction
of total IFC financing and that IFC funding and bilateral equity investment taken
together is even a smaller fraction of total FDI. Perhaps more importantly, the table
shows that LDCs score badly when compared to higher income countries. This holds for
bilateral equity investment as well as the already mentioned IFC funding and FDI. It
also holds for total private flows. Over the period 1995-2000, the least developed
countries only receive 1 per cent of total (bilateral) private flows to developing
countries and FDI, moving up to 9 per cent of all IFC funding and 15 per cent of all
bilateral (ODA plus OOF) equity investments.10
Table 4
Distribution of PSD conditionalities in World Bank adjustment operations, 1996-99
1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Business environment 26 15 13 23 77
Corporate restructuring 2 2 32 15 51
Legal and judicial reform 9 13 5 11 38
Privatization 32 36 29 18 115
Public enterprise reform 17 9 2 3 31
Private participation in infrastructure 13 25 19 30 87
Total 99 100 100 100
Source:  World Bank (2001a: 26).
                                                
9 The World Bank’s 2002 strategy document reports only shares of total assistance and sizes of changes
in magnitudes rather than actual magnitudes themselves. The Bank’s (2001c) OED report is only
slightly less cryptic. A central problem in quantifying adjustment operation-based PSD lending is that
such operations were almost always embodied in broader programmes. The 2001 Review states that
around 250 credits made by the World Bank between 1994-99 had one or more PSD component. The
total value of these credits was US$ 11.4 billion.
10 There is no discrepancy between the data presented here and that in Table 5, and the latter’s
subsequent discussion. The earlier discussion refers to FDI stock rather than recent FDI flows and to
IFC funding over a much longer period. A comparison between the two sets of data suggests some
recent marginal improvements in LDC’s shares of both sources of funds.12
Table 5
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51.6 1956-00 Financial services 2.6%
Utilities 8.5%
4.1
MIGA Guarantees 9.0 1988-02 na na
IBRD/IDA On-lending to private
credit providers
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Sources: World Bank (2001a, 2001c); IFC (2000); MIGA (2001); AsDB (2000, 2001a, 2001b); AfDB
(2001); IADB (2001); IIC (2001); MIF (2001); CDB (2001); EBRD (2002); EIB (2002).13
Notes to Table 5
(a During 1983-1990, 60 per cent of AsDB’s lending to private sector support operations went
to only six countries (Bangladesh, PR China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Philippines), of
which only Bangladesh is a LDC. Twenty of its 43 regional member countries received no
private sector lending (AsDB 2001a).
(b At the same time, public sector operations still dominate AfDB operations with 81 per cent of
total approvals in 2001. Many of these have a clear link with PSD elements, making total
PSD-related funding of the AfDB substantially higher than US$ 241 million for 2001,
certainly when also activities of the African Development Bank Fund and the Nigeria Trust
Fund are also taken into account.
(c Including to projects under public sector ownership.
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657.7 -14.9 642.8 3,375.2 433,874.7 661,995.5
Least developed
countries
81.8 15.1 96.9 305.0 4,642.2 6,904.0
Other low -income
countries
265.7 35.0 300.7 627.0 50,669.4 59,290.4
Low-middle income
countries
124.3 70.3 194.6 718.9 58,705.6 83,651.5
Upper middle-income
countries
16.2 -142.2 -126.0 1,565.4 194,621.3 308,268.3
High income
countries
0.4 2.6 3.0 -18.0 1,115.1 5,429.5
Part II countries 71.3 55.8 127.1 397.5 181,933.4 316,308.4
Grand total 729.0 40.9 769.8 3,772.7 615,868.2 978,303.9
Source: DAC International Development Statistics (online)
Notes: Figures are totals for the period 1995-2000;
Part II countries are countries in transition.
These tables suggest a number of provisional observations. The first is that, in terms of
volume of financial commitments to destinations normally counted as developing
countries, the World Bank Group accounts for the overwhelming bulk of all private
sector-directed lending. What is probably the largest single multilateral or quasi-
multilateral lender to the private sector, the European Development Bank, lends over 85
per cent within the EU itself. Second, funding goes largely to only two sectors:
infrastructure and financial services. Third, levels of lending to LDCs are extremely
low. Because some development banks have no or only one or two LDCs amongst their
members, it is better to try to estimate an overall proportion of multilateral and quasi-
multilateral lending going to private sectors in LDCs than to discuss the performance of
particular banks (with the exception of those whose remit is global) in this respect. The
authors’ estimate is that LDCs probably account for between 1.5 per cent and 2.0 per
cent of this total lending. As for multilaterals with global remits, IFC allocates 4.1 per
cent of lending to LDCs. These figures seem very low, although it should be noted that14
LDCs’ share of total world inward private FDI stock in 1999 was much lower still—
only 0.6 per cent (UNCTAD 2000: Annex Table B3). Fourth, on-lending to private
credit institutions for SME, and micro-enterprise finance is usually hived off to separate
units whereas (except in the case of the World Bank Group) term loans, equity
investments and guarantees are covered by generic, presumably ‘core’ administrations.
Fifth, micro-finance and lending to SMEs, however broadly defined, comprise only a
tiny part of direct lending for PSD. At the same time, regional development banks
appear to dedicate far higher proportions of their resources to this than does the World
Bank Group, where the contribution is negligible.
3.3 Bilateral funding for PSD
Levels of bilateral PSD funding are difficult to determine, if only because some donors
have a tendency to hide PSD-related programmes under different headings and
‘sectors’. Some of these programmes are, at first sight, neither recognizable, nor
described, as PSD programmes. A possible way for determining the magnitude of PSD
funding in relationship to total development aid is to look at the latter’s distribution
according to purposes of aid, as reported to the DAC. Annex 1 matches the purposes as
distinguished by the DAC with the different levels of PSD described earlier. In theory,
of course, basically all purposes could be linked to one or more PSD levels. This could
even be said of purposes such as emergency aid, whereas the private sector provides
goods and services. This would mean that basically all aid is directed at PSD, which
naturally is not the case.11
One could also count in those purposes that are either directly linked to the economy
(i.e., economic infrastructure and services, and production sectors) and add commodity
aid and general-purpose aid (mainly because it includes structural adjustment assistance
via the World Bank/IMF plus other general programme and commodity assistance). On
this basis, Table 7 shows that Japan (as can be expected because of its emphasis on
infrastructure projects) is the biggest bilateral donor with more than 60 per cent of
bilateral aid commitments in 1998 going to PSD. Using the same criteria, most donors
can be said to be spending 20 to 30 per cent of their bilateral aid on activities related to
PSD. Even a donor like Ireland, which hardly claims to be active in the field of PSD,
still spends more than 16 per cent.12
                                                
11 Interesting in this regard is, for instance, the remark by New Zealand (DAC 1995) with regard to
social policy and infrastructure development as elements of PSD: ‘There is some doubt whether this
category is appropriate to classify under “private sector development” given that the primary purpose
of social policy and infrastructural development is for the “public good”’.
12 One of the few bilateral donors for whom data on PSD related expenditure are readily available is
New Zealand. Over 1995, NZODA calculated that 18 per cent of its total bilateral budget was to be
considered as PSD assistance and this would even increase to 32 per cent if one would assume ‘that
100 per cent of the private education and training awards result in increased skills for private sector
activity’ (DAC 1995: 81). It would, of course, be possible to add all expenditures for specific PSD
programmes together but this would still leave out expenditures for other elements that are not
grouped under a specific programme. In its 1999 annual report, AfD (France), for instance, notes total
commitments of slightly more than € 217 million under the heading for private sector development
(including PROPARCO, ARIA and Equity guarantees funds). However, this excludes commitments
for micro-finance and for specific banking and financial subsidiaries under AfD, to name just a few
PSD related elements (AfD 2000).15
Table 7
Funding to ‘PSD’ following DAC classification of purposes








Australia 25.0 Germany 26.4 Norway 15.3
Austria 7.0 Ireland 16.6 Portugal 16.9
Belgium 21.5 Italy 15.6 Spain 20.8
Canada 22.9 Japan 62.1 Sweden 17.6
Denmark 15.7 Luxembourg 17.6 Switzerland 27.2
Finland 21.6 Netherlands 16.4 United Kingdom 28.8
France 20.9 New Zealand 11.7 United States 29.7
TOTAL 35.6
Source:  Own calculations on the basis of DAC (2000)
3.4 An overview of funding
The uncertainty with regard to determining levels of funding for PSD is further
strengthened by the fact that not all interventions categorized under PSD necessarily fall
under budgets for development cooperation (and thus ODA). Table 7, for instance, does
not cover official aid (OA) figures for PSD-related activities, nor ODA contributions to
multilateral organizations which in turn use such funds (also) for PSD programmes.
Moreover, PSD programmes are also supported through non-ODA funds, particularly
by multilateral organizations such as the IFC and the regional development banks (but
also by bilateral donors). For calculating total funding for PSD, therefore, the so-called
other official flows (OOF) should also be taken into account. Data on the distribution of
such funds for PSD by multilateral organizations are not readily available, however.
The only thing left to do, then, is to turn to each agency individually. Although this is
not accurate, financial data from each separate multilateral donor can provide additional
insight in the funding pattern. Table 5 already provided some aggregate figures for the
multilateral donors considered here. The table clearly showed IFC to be the major
funding agency for PSD-related activities. In fiscal year 2001 alone, for instance, the
IFC signed and processed a total of 194 projects in 70 countries, 18 regional projects
and 5 worldwide projects with a total commitment of US$ 3.9 billion.13 In the same
year, another 245 country, regional and worldwide projects were approved for financing
to the tune of US$ 5.4 billion. MIGA, another World Bank Group member whose main
objective is to promote ‘the flow of investment to and among developing countries’,
implemented in FY 2001 a total of 59 technical assistance or advisory service projects
in 38 countries under the banner of investment marketing services.14 The same year,
MIGA also provided investment guarantees for an amount of nearly US$ 2 billion for
45 projects in 27 countries for such diverse activities as equity investment by the Habib
Bank AG Zurich in its Pakistan branches and a shareholder loan from Dole Food
                                                
13 The majority of funds were committed as loans (40.4 per cent), followed by syndications (30.6 per
cent), guarantees (11.7 per cent), equity (9.9 per cent), quasi-equity (6.7 per cent) and risk mitigation
products (0.6 per cent).
14 These projects were often implemented in collaboration with the World Bank—IFC Foreign
Investment Advisory Service (FISA) (see below).16
Company, Inc. to the Ecuadorian company Bananapuerto Puerto Bananero S.A. (MIGA
2002).
Although the above perhaps does not provide a definitive answer to the question of
funding of PSD by bilateral and multilateral organizations (whether falling under ODA,
OA and/or OOF), the broad picture is clear. The increased attention to private sector
development that can be seen in the policy discourse, can also be detected in substantial
funding. As such, PSD is increasingly important in ‘word and deed’.
4 Issues arising from bilateral and multilateral donors’ programmes
While bilateral and multilateral donors share very similar analyses of the significance
and preferred focus of PSD, they do not necessarily emphasize the same issues and
interventions. In this section we take a closer look at the similarities and differences
between the two channels of development cooperation. Four issues considered to be
central to the discussion of PSD are raised here (also see Schulpen and Gibbon 2002):
(i) justifications for public intervention in supporting developing country private
enterprise as such; (ii) justifications for programme and country selection; (iii) inter-
donor competition and coordination; and (iv) internal and external coherence.15 These
issues relate not only to bilateral donors but also to multilateral ones, in some cases in
more acute forms.
4.1 Justifications for public intervention
A central issue for public support to private firms and markets in developing countries is
whether such support ‘crowds out’ private provision. Related arguments concern the
opportunity cost of using public assistance in this way, and possible linkages between
such support and political patronage on the one hand and the imposition of political
conditions on private investment on the other.16
In relation to the middle-income countries that provide many of the leading destinations
for the interventions described here, the ‘crowding out’ argument probably has some
merit. On the other hand, even in these countries the leading sector subject to support
(infrastructure) is one where private capital is universally reluctant to invest without
public support, due to long project gestation times, high risk and typically low rates of
                                                
15 A fifth issue worth mentioning is that of tied aid. For a more general discussion on aid tying, see
elsewhere in this publication and for a discussion on aid tying in relation to bilateral PSD support, see
Schulpen and Gibbon (2001). All bilateral donors stress the necessity of involving their own private
sector justifying this not only in altruistic terms (providing investment, technology, know-how and
employment) but also sometimes explicitly instrumental ways—providing the opportunity to support
their own (foreign and domestic) economic interests vis-à-vis those of other countries (and other
donor countries in particular). For multilateral organizations, not having a private sector of their
‘own’, these issues are not relevant, although some also emphasize the close interaction between
improving flows of developed country private finance and opening (capital) accounts in recipient
countries.
16 See, for example, the criticisms of the US’s Overseas Private Investment Corporation by the Institute
for Business Research and the Competitive Enterprise Institute, two Washington-based right-of-centre
think tanks, available at: www.progress.org/banneker/cwopic.htm  .17
return. Furthermore, many infrastructure projects concern public goods, in the sense that
the majority of benefits accrue to users, rather than owners. With regard to LDCs, the
core argument here simply appears to be wrong. FDI into these countries tends to be
very low and directed mainly at ‘enclave’ projects with low multiplier effects, while
local private investors and investment institutions are typically thin on the ground,
highly risk adverse and expensive to use (e.g., spreads between deposit and lending
rates tend to be very high, possibly justifying an element of subsidy). Moreover, there is
a series of direct obstacles to local borrowing. For example, weak property rights and
commercial dispute settlement procedures militate against collateralization of assets. In
these circumstances, it can be more convincingly argued that selective public support is
a pre-condition of larger-scale private sector activity outside of extractive sectors.
Counter-arguments of the latter kind provide the basis for claims which suggest that,
rather than ‘crowding out’ private investment, public support reins in additional
investment. This argument is advanced by some of the regional development banks
themselves (e.g., AsDB 2000: 15-6; AfDB n.d.). The AsDB (op. cit.) claims, for
example, that every dollar it lends catalyses US$8 finance from other sources.  More
recently, efforts have been made to distinguish and provide definitions of different
forms of such ‘additionality’ (catalytic effect, value-added effect and ‘template’-cum-
demonstration effect).17 However, a common problem of such claims is their counter-
factual: it is virtually impossible to know whether ‘catalysed’ finance would have been
activated in one form or another without co-financing and loan syndication
arrangements.
4.3 Programme and country selection
Despite the plethora of interventions mentioned in Annex 2, in practice there are only a
few instruments that make up most bilateral PSD programmes (see for some examples
Schulpen and Gibbon 2002). In general, bilateral donors focus on macro- and micro-
levels. At the former level, programmes cover almost everything from bilateral policy
dialogue to technical aid for specific interventions such as privatization, all with the aim
of creating a conducive environment for the private sector. A few donors (e.g.,
Germany) include in these macro programmes elements such as support to chambers of
commerce, labour unions and employers’ organizations (or, in general, instruments
aimed at strengthening aspects of the institutional infrastructure). Second, they concern
elements at the micro-level, with instruments ranging from direct financial support to
MSEs to management training, from sending out (senior) experts to individual
enterprises, to assisting self-help groups, and from export promotion programmes (to
and from developing countries) to the promotion of joint ventures and the provision of
investment guarantees. The Dutch FMO, the Danish IFU, the Canadian PSDI fund, the
Belgian technology and know-how transfer programmes, the Finnish Export Credit Ltd,
and the Norwegian NORFUND and GIEK are all examples of this emphasis on direct
micro-level support. Moreover, these programmes incorporate bilateral donors’ own
private sectors (see below).
While the multilaterals share with bilaterals very similar analyses of the significance
and preferred direction of PSD, the overall shape of their programmes is much simpler.
                                                
17 Cf. papers presented at a recent IFC/IIC Workshop on Additionality, available at: www.iadb.org/iic/
english/additionality/index.htm  .18
As noted above, these tend to comprise only two broad groups of components, namely
conditionality-based adjustment lending and direct lending to the private sector
(including, in the regional development bank case, on-lending for SME and micro-
finance development).
Conditionality-based adjustment lending for PSD is typically not undertaken at all by
bilateral donors, although the latter do fund it through World Bank operations.
Arguably, since the conditions set by the World Bank are supposed to be based on a
close analysis of the recipient countries’ economic environments, in its lending to the
private sector the World Bank Group should be in a particularly good position to base
its choices between countries on the relative favourability of their business
environments. Bilateral donors, who at least until recently have tended not to conduct
independent evaluations of the recipient’s economic and business environments, do not
have the advantage of this kind of direct knowledge when allocating private sector
support. Yet, there seems to be no association between the World Bank’s assessments of
recipient countries’ economic and business environments and the destination of the
World Bank Group’s direct lending to the private sector. Nine countries account for
well over half of IFC’s cumulative commitments, for example. These are, in rank order,
Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Turkey, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and the
Philippines. Brazil, Argentina and Mexico (in the same rank order) also happen to be
the leading recipients of Inter-American Development Bank support to the private
sector, while India, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines make up four of the six
largest Asian Development Bank PSD recipient countries.
Most of these countries have been subject to international criticism with respect to
macroeconomic policy and IMF stabilization programmes especially during the 1980s
and early 1990s (see, for example, Berry 1998). Nonetheless, multilateral donors have
directed the bulk of their PSD lending to them, presumably on commercial grounds,
regardless of how ‘enabling’ their environments were considered. It is clear that these
destinations were considered attractive both by private investors and by multilateral
agencies on the grounds of potential short-term profitability deriving from the size of
their markets alone. Since all the multilaterals (with the exception of the IsDB) have
recently affirmed the strictly commercial nature of their lending, this discrepancy seems
likely to increase rather than to decrease. Similar arguments can be advanced in relation
to bilateral donors’ country selections for PSD support, which usually seem to be based
on traditional aid partners or commercial interests or both.
4.4 Internal and external coherence
The fact that multilaterals’ motives in selecting partner countries and projects for direct
lending to the private sector are mainly commercial, directly raises the question of
‘internal’ coherence between these interventions and objectives such as long-term
economic growth, poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. Not all private
investment leads to long-term growth. And while economic growth—where it is
attained—is a precondition of long-term poverty alleviation, not all growth leads to19
poverty reduction and, historically, much of it has been environmentally harmful. Even
where growth is pro-poor, the links may be highly indirect rather than direct.18
As noted earlier, two of the five multilateral donors considered here have adopted
(albeit very recently) ‘compliance’ mechanisms requiring at least some private sector
operations to have tangible development and even ‘pro-poor’ consequences. In regard to
the latter, privatization operations can now be required to have safety-net elements,19
while utility schemes can be required to demonstrate an extension of services to poor
customers, and so on. But the setting of such requirements appears to be confined to
financing for former SOEs and/or enterprises supplying ‘public goods’ and a majority of
multilaterals do not apply them at all. Some even utilize guidelines for lending that
directly appear to encourage low-wage employment. For example, the IADB’s (2002)
operational policy on industrial development gives explicit preference to ‘projects based
on […] efficient [plants] that can compete at least with the lowest cost level in the
region’.
It is, therefore, not surprising that, where multilaterals’ policies discuss explicitly the
relation between PSD and poverty reduction, direct links are typically referred to only in
relation to SMEs and micro-enterprises. As shown in Table 5, many multilateral donors
have run or supported programmes of this kind, usually on concessionary terms. In most
cases, however, the amounts committed as part of explicit PSD initiatives (i.e., through
private intermediaries) have been small.20 Moreover the current tendency, at least in the
World Bank, appears to be to lend only on non-concessionary terms or to replace on-
lending for SMEs and micro-finance by technical assistance to capacity building of
institutions specializing’ in these purposes (World Bank 2001a: 13, 2002: 40).21
Identical issues of internal coherence exist in the case of the bilateral donors. As already
noted, most of the bilateral donors who have developed a clear PSD policy have also
                                                
18 Cf. Eurodad’s (2002) reaction to the World Bank PSD strategy. Eurodad states that ‘there is no
clarification in the document on what the WBG means by the “market”, nor is there any specification
of how the “poor” would benefit from the strategy’. More specifically, the PSD strategy is criticized
for focusing ‘exclusively on the needs of private firms’ thereby ‘neglecting to address the main
concerns of the poor’. As such, Eurodad questions the automatic link between PSD and poverty
reduction which forms the point of departure in the World Bank strategy (and in the strategies of
practically all other donors).
19 An important question here, however, is whether safety-nets should precede or accompany
privatization. This seems to have been one of the issues giving rise to tensions within the World Bank
around the writing of World Development Report 2000. Those arguing for ‘precede’ did so on the
grounds that evidence suggests that safety-nets are effective only when they are constructed in
advance; those arguing the other position took the view that construction before could lead to
prevarication with privatization itself (Wade 2002).
20 Of course, if definitions of SMEs are loosened, the amounts become much bigger. The Inter-American
Investment Corporation (2001) claims that 87.1 per cent of all its disbursements have been to SMEs,
but an analysis of these indicates an average commitment of US$ 6.7 million Another Inter-American
Development Bank affiliate, the Multilateral Investment Fund, actually defines ‘small enterprises’ as
ones with ‘sales of US$ 3-5 million and fewer than 100 employees’ (www.iadb/mif.org).
21 The World Bank (2002: 41, 51) also proposes to end direct financial support for business advisory
support services to SMEs, in favour of technical assistance for the development of ‘market-based
SME support systems…’. The Inter-American Development Bank already ended such support in the
1990s. But an evaluation from 2000 (IADB 2000) noted ‘a potential conflict between fee-based
sustainability and the mission to serve smaller and less-established firms’.20
tried, formally at least, to align their PSD activities with the objective of poverty
reduction. CIDA, for instance, distinguishes (besides interventions regarding the
informal sector) three levels of PSD intervention with links to poverty reduction. The
first is the macro-policy level, with interventions here aimed at affecting the policy
environment to ‘address the root causes of poverty of the country as a whole’. The
specific policy areas mentioned include trade policy, financial and public sector reform,
the removal of systematic constraints that prohibit the ownership of assets by women
and reallocation of public expenditures towards basic infrastructure services. The
second level is the focused programmes that benefit the poor disproportionately but do
not have specified groups of the poor as direct beneficiaries. This description is given to
interventions such as capacity building with micro-finance organizations or agricultural
research and training. Finally, there are programmes directly targeted at poor groups but
which are not part of interventions aimed at the informal sector. These include, for
instance, training of micro-entrepreneurs (CIDA 1995a, 1995b).
Germany uses a similar distinction between the levels of PSD policy interventions and
poverty reduction (DAC 1998), while the United States depicts poverty reduction as a
consequence of interventions to create an open and democratic environment in which
the private sector is given the space to develop. Other donors, who have not (yet)
developed an integrated PSD policy, nevertheless also consider their activities in this
field, in accordance with the views expressed within the DAC, as part of the fight
against poverty. An overall impression is that the PSD interaction—poverty reduction
connection—is asserted more often than demonstrated, however. Even where a
connection is reasonably clear intellectually, mechanisms for assuring compliance in
practice are generally absent. While the importance of support for general
macroeconomic policies which promote poverty reduction is clear, it is still worthwhile
asking whether donor policy coherence does not demand a stronger and more direct link
between other aspects of PSD policy and poverty reduction.
A second type of (in)coherence (external) refers to the question of whether PSD-related
activities are consistent with broader donor country policy concerns with a bearing on
developing countries and not simply those seen as the objects of development
cooperation. Tables 2 and 3 showed that only some bilateral and no multilateral donors
explicitly acknowledge the international level in their PSD policies. At the same time,
the overview of programmes and interventions presented in Annex 2 shows that most
donors are aware that it is insufficient to look only at internal obstacles to and
preconditions for PSD. This still leaves open the issue of whether donor insistence that
recipient countries open up their markets, integrate with the world market and increase
exports goes hand in hand with striving towards eliminating their own domestic
subsidies and non-tariff barriers to trade. As the DAC (1994) puts it:
OECD Member countries’ [own] policies, particularly in the sphere of
trade, investment and financial flows, must be coherent with policies
espoused by donor agencies vis-à-vis private sector development in the
developing world, such as the need for recipient countries to facilitate
foreign direct investment, liberalize capital movements and financial
markets and promote export-led development.22
                                                
22 See Schulpen and Gibbon (2002) for a short description of the rather mixed performance of bilateral
donors in the field of external coherence.21
Where issues of coherence have been acknowledged at all by donors, these have been
somewhat perversely in terms of recognizing a lack of ‘PSD consciousness’ in their
own organizations. In most instances, this recognition translates into a call for
‘mainstreaming’ PSD and more staff training in the field of PSD. Norway (NORAD
1999), for instance, acknowledges that ‘the [PSD] approach […] will require increased
competence and capacity within this area in the aid administration both at home and at
the embassies’. Although perhaps misidentifying the central problem, it is clear that a
lack of understanding of PSD issues and perspectives amongst core agency staff also
has negative effects. It is no better to only state that ‘private sector considerations must
be taken into account in designing and appraising all ODA activities’ (NZODA 1998:
21) than it is only to say that poverty considerations should be mainstreamed into PSD
activity. Both require systematic thought and planning. A possible way forward in both
cases is to expand the development of criteria and guidelines in the direction started by
AsDB and the World Bank, so that a selection of instruments occurs which is based on
what is needed and not simply on what is available. More important still, both require
institutional change (e.g., staff motivation and incentives, institutional culture,
organizational change) and capacity strengthening (e.g., human resource development
and skills, resources and knowledge, instruments, planning and management). Up to
now, little evidence can be found of donors taking the need for mainstreaming very
seriously, whether of poverty reduction into PSD, or PSD into broader development
work.
4.5 Competition and coordination
Except at the level of major overlaps in formal policy pronouncements, it seems clear
that there is little in the way of coordination between multilateral or bilateral donors in
general,  within multilaterals or bilaterals as distinct groups of donors, or even amongst
different divisions or windows of the same multilateral agency, with respect to PSD. At
least, there is little evidence of any clear division of labour, which might reflect such
coordination. Amongst multilaterals, while regional development banks have some
micro- and SME finance focus (reflected in specialized units like IADB’s MIF and
AfDB’s AMINA) that is lacking in the World bank, the bulk of private sector lending in
both cases is made up of equity loans, guarantees and technical assistance to specific
enterprises. As noted, there is also a strong overlap in terms of destinations by sector
and country. Lack of coordination between multilaterals has almost certainly increased
in recent years, for up to the mid-1990s an implicit division of labour was detectable
between the regional development banks, which then lent overwhelmingly to the public
sector, and the World Bank Group’s IFC and MIGA wings, who were lending to private
business. With the new increased emphasis on PSD by the regional development banks,
this division of labour has evaporated.
The same is true with respect to traditional divisions of labour within single multilateral
donors themselves. Two or three generations of internal reorganization within the World
Bank Group still leaves a confusing picture concerning the provision of private sector
advisory services, for example. In the late 1990s, a joint IFC-World Bank foreign
investment advisory service (FIAS) was created, although both wings continued to
provide advisory services separately (the IFC through its Corporate Financial Services
Division [CFSD]). This was followed by a further reorganization in 2000, when a
private sector advisory service was created by a merger of FIAS, CFSD and part of the
World Bank PSD Department. Within the World Bank Group, such services are still22
being provided separately by MIGA’s Investment Marketing Services Division,
however. The recent World Bank (2002: 70) strategy document acknowledges another
dimension of this problem: ‘IDA, IFC and MIGA have sometimes all been
independently engaged on the same projects (using similar or different) forms of
financing…’.23
Such problems of ‘internal coordination’ are not restricted to the World Bank Group,
however. One of the main criticisms of the micro-level PSD interventions of the
Netherlands expressed by Dutch enterprises over the years has been that there was no
single window these companies could turn to. They were correct: although all micro-
level PSD programmes with a connection to Dutch enterprises and supported by ODA
fall under the responsibility of one department within the Ministry for Development
Cooperation, the implementation of these programmes is in the hands of different
agencies, often working independently of each other and of the Ministry. Particularly
because donors regard PSD as an increasingly important element for development
(cooperation) and new types of interventions are appearing, there is a need for
streamlining interventions.
While steps have been taken to improve the inter-donor coordination around lending for
SME finance, none have been reported with regard to lending to larger enterprises. As
long as there has been a discussion on the merits of tied aid (i.e., since the 1970s),
injunctions to avoid competition between bilateral donors in the field of export credits
have been made repeatedly. Not only have these fallen on deaf ears, but inter-bilateral
competition appears now to extend also to other elements of PSD, from trade and
investment instruments at micro-level (whether or not connected to the donor country’s
own private sector), through the increasing range of technical, financial and/or training
facilities made available, to policy advice. Furthermore, there still appears to be no
mechanisms at all within the World Bank Group for coordinating the activities of
MIGA with its other wings. Similar problems are recognized by the AsDB (2000) in its
PSD work. A discussion of the ‘lessons learned’ states that AsDB’s ‘public and private
sector windows should have worked more closely together to increase benefits to its
member countries and optimize development benefits…’.
As a result, developing countries can feel constrained to enter into relationships with
export (or import) promotion commissions from different donor countries, while their
government ministries and agencies draw on similar programmes from a variety of
sources, and it becomes easy for them to lose sight of all the private sector-
strengthening donor interventions and of all the PSD assistance coming their way. This
shows that, even if the similarity between PSD interventions does not lead to greater
competition between donors, there is a growing need for coordination, mutual learning
and (perhaps) cooperation between donors.
Where some donor coordination on PSD does exist, it appears to be mainly found at
three levels. At the policy level, there have been some important developments mainly,
through the coordination role of the DAC, that have lead to mutually agreed (but very
broad) policy guidelines (DAC 1994, 1995, 1997). Second, there is a degree of
coordination around a handful of highly specialized PSD-related projects, such as the
‘Eco Trade Manual’, covering environmental regulations and standards in OECD
                                                
23 This is not only important from a coordination point of view but certainly also to ensure greater
internal coherence.23
markets. This is funded by CBI (Netherlands), NORAD (Norway), Danida (Denmark)
and Sida (Sweden) (DAC 1997: 18). Third, there is localized cooperation in a few
recipient countries around specific programmes, such as the ‘Business Environment
Strengthening of Tanzania’ programme supported by DFID, Sida, DGIS and Danida.
Within some agencies at least, resistance exists even to such incremental changes.24
The poverty reduction strategy process, engaged in by a number of recipient countries
that have applied for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)
Initiative, may lead to greater coordination in practice. This process is supposed to
involve the recipient country’s private sector as ‘stakeholders’ and to formulate a
centralized list of poverty reduction-relevant private sector projects that donors can
choose to support. Since this is a relatively new development, it is too early to see if it is
making much of a difference.
5 PSD in practice
Norway’s PSD policy ends with a short reference to evaluation where it is stated that
‘an important basis for future evaluation of Norwegian support for private sector
development has been laid through the preparation of this strategy’ (NORAD 1999).
Formally, the statement is correct. Before being able to evaluate interventions in the
light of their contribution to PSD, one needs, as the statement continues, ‘precise
specification of objectives and expected results’. Unfortunately, in relation to PSD, such
‘precise specifications’ are either missing or are of a such recent nature that few policy-
based evaluations are yet available. Simultaneously, the large diversity of what goes
under the name of donor PSD interventions presents a further difficulty. First, it is not
always clear whether all these interventions have been actually and directly
implemented with a view to strengthening the private sector in developing countries.
The fact, for instance, that many parts of  PSD programmes are aimed at economic
development in general or at individual enterprises, rather than the development of the
private sector as such, is a case in point here. In such cases, the relation between
intervention and the intended consequences with regard to the private sector is at best
indirect and, thus, by definition difficult to assess. Finally, although it is true that
development aid is in general an activity that is subject to frequent evaluation, many
such studies that touch upon PSD-related issues are of a project type and not easy to
generalize conclusions from.
Nevertheless, an attempt by Schulpen and Gibbon (2001) to draw generalized
conclusions from a number of such PSD-related evaluation studies of bilateral donors
identified some provisional findings. On the basis of 15 evaluation studies from six
bilateral donors, the assessment concluded, among other things, that bilateral donors’
PSD-related interventions frequently lacked a clear set of objectives, reflected in a
general lack of guidelines and selection criteria. Moreover, the selection of
intermediaries chosen to implement programmes often suffered from problems
                                                
24 While being involved in PSD missions, one of the present authors has been informed by donor agency
staff that they consider inter-donor coordination problematic. This is because it involves them in
agreeing to common management practices, accounting methods, and so on, and because it is more
difficult to show quick results when a lot of time has to be invested in ‘learning about each others’
expectations’.24
concerning their ability to conform to donor ‘best practice’ and ‘ownership’ of broader
aid objectives, while the selection of target firms, and even of countries of operation,
sometimes suffered from a lack of transparency. In general, the evaluation studies
showed an excessive focus on simple hardware or training package-related transfers,
and a lack of focus on institution building (a point strengthened by the tendency for
PSD interventions to have a strong tied-aid component). Finally, most PSD-related
interventions seemed to lack a point of departure in the real capacities, modes of
operation and internal relations found in private sectors in  recipient countries, both in
their firms and institutions. Instead, interventions were usually based on models of
business development derived from developed countries. Finally, given the highly
specialized nature of the mind-frame and perspective necessary for successful work
with the private sector, and their fundamental difference from those necessary for other
types of development agency activity, these evaluation studies posed the question
whether bilateral donor agencies were a suitable home for PSD activities as such.
Unfortunately, evaluations of multilaterals’ PSD operations are also rather thin on the
ground. Overview evaluations or assessments are available only for the World Bank and
the AsDB. Furthermore, that of the AsDB mostly comprises a discussion of its lending’s
financial performance. Unpublished evaluations by the AfDB and IADB, referred to in
these organizations’ annual reports for 2001, also appear to be largely financial in focus.
It should be noted that all the multilateral evaluations referred to were conducted
internally, rather than by external consultants.
As in the case of bilateral donors’ PSD interventions, the main issues concerning aid
(in-)effectiveness raised by recent evaluations of World Bank programmes (World Bank
2001a, 2002) include the consistency of interventions with broader aid objectives (as
well as some of the specific objectives of PSD support itself); consistency with donors’
‘best practice’ in specific areas; and relevance to the particular circumstances of
recipient countries. Certain observations in the AsDB’s published evaluation can also be
considered under these headings.
Inadequate consideration of institutional issues, and on this basis of the distributional
consequences of PSD interventions, is mentioned several times in the World Bank’s
evaluation from 2001. Privatization-related PSD programmes are acknowledged to have
had benefits of improved efficiency, particularly through reductions in fiscal burdens
following sale or liquidation of loss-making SOEs. But, as a result of ‘underestimation
[of] both the importance and complexity of the institutional underpinnings of PSD…’
(World Bank 2001a: 2) and of ‘the time required to develop effective regulative
capacity’ (op. cit.: 23), these benefits proved either one-off and/or ‘not widely shared by
society’ (op. cit.: 2). This had been exacerbated by the continuing absence of a
conceptual framework for understanding ‘pro-poor’ enterprise reform (op. cit.: 22).
An identified related issue concerns a lack of internalization of more specific PSD-
centred aims in certain PSD programmes or operations. Whereas PSD programmes aim
to promote greater competition and more transparent regulation, certain privatization
and ‘public participation in infrastructure’ operations have not reflected these principles
(op. cit.: 21) The same observation is made in the AsDB (2000: 46) report. The relation
between specific PSD interventions and promotion of competition is raised on a more
general plane by the apparent admission by the World Bank (2002: 54) that IFC credit
in general embodies an element of subsidy, despite the supposed prevalence of market-
based lending principles.25
Proposals to overcome these problems revolve around the introduction of ‘performance-
based investment’ and/or ‘output-based aid’ (op. cit.: 65), whereby donor lending to
certain private sector activities is back- rather than front-loaded. That is, finance is
released when ‘development outcomes’ have become visible. In this context, subsidies
would be made explicit, reserved for interventions with explicit pro-poor content, and
released only when agreed targets have been met. By implication, the subsidy element
would be withdrawn from all other PSD lending. Little detail has so far been provided
of what performance standards might look like, how private partners might finance
installation or start-up costs alone, or the methodology for determining and removing
subsidies on other PSD lending.
Since multilateral donors do not operate tied aid programmes administered through
intermediaries, problems arising from the latter’s failure to absorb donor ‘best practice’
do not emerge as an issue in their evaluations, as they do in those of bilaterals. On the
other hand, diluted forms of the same problem of ‘ownership’ are identified, arising
from the dispersal of private sector operations within multilateral agencies. According to
the World Bank’s 2001 evaluation (World Bank 2001a: 2) only 91 of its (up to this
point) 250 credits with PSD components were actually managed by the Bank’s PSD
Department. A large proportion of the balance seems to have represented components
relating to the financial sector, which although a major subject of PSD policy was not
officially part of PSD ‘work’. As a result, ‘the record of assistance for financial sector
reform [has] not been strong…’ (op. cit.: 8, 10).
As in the case of bilateral donors, a considerable volume of criticism in evaluation
reports is devoted to a lack of relevance of interventions to the particular circumstances
of recipient countries. Most commentary under this heading is again directed at a lack of
focus on (national) institutional issues. However whereas for bilaterals, recipient
country institutional issues were held to be neglected in favour of ‘supply-driven’
hardware and training packages, in the case of the World Bank they were neglected in
favour of pursuing more visible and tangible structural reforms such as the privatization
of specific enterprises and enactment of specific laws (ibid.). The prioritization of such
structural reforms is questioned on the basis of its derivation from ‘a tendency to apply
the same solution to all countries’, thereby ignoring differences in institutional
underpinnings (op. cit.: 14). In low-income countries as a group, patient development of
institutions should have preceded ‘promotion [of reforms of] corporate governance,
insolvency/bankruptcy reform [or even] property rights…’ (op. cit.: 8).
In the World Bank’s new PSD strategy, the lesson derived from these criticisms appears
to be that—where they are detected—‘flawed investment climates’ require rectification
before established forms of PSD support, including direct lending to private enterprise,
can be effective. It is not very clear whether this position represents an
acknowledgement of the ‘one size fits all’ criticism or a restatement of a ‘one size fit
all’ view in a different form. For it is apparently still planned to identify ‘flaws’ in
investment climates on the basis of local departures from an (Anglo-Saxon) ideal type.
Over and above these concerns, both the World Bank and the AsDB evaluations share
the concern of some bilateral evaluations with inadequate monitoring. Lack of effective
financial reporting is identified as an issue in both cases. In that of the AsDB (2001a: 5),
it appears that the only financial reporting undertaken prior to 2000 was of too
aggregate a nature to distinguish the performance of private from public sector lending.
In the case of the World Bank (2002) there are also calls to initiate monitoring both of26
non-financial but still economic measures of performance (e.g., productivity changes
following investments) as well as non-economic dimensions. For private participation in
infrastructure projects, the latter include changes in access to services for low-income
groups and levels of charges/subsidies levied on/provided to low-income groups.
6 Conclusions
A comparison between bilateral and multilateral donors with regard to their PSD
policies, programmes, instruments and funding raises several issues. First of all,
similarities in policy are very substantial. Donors, whether bi- or multilateral, all depart
from the same logic—a logic in which a ‘one  size  fits  all’ model of an ‘enabling
environment’ for PSD plays a central role. At the same time, there are differences in
emphasis and ‘new’ issues—ranging from the obligations of western countries to open
up their own markets to demands for better ‘corporate governance’ in developing
ones—emerge over time (although more strongly via multilaterals).
Second, both groups of donors show a strong preference for instruments and
programmes at national macro- and micro-level, although the instruments of the
multilateral donors are much simpler and basically comprise adjustment lending, direct
lending to the private sector and support to micro/SME finance. All in all, however,
there is a wide overlap in programmes and instruments.
Third, there also is a major overlap in beneficiary countries, while the selection of these
countries is not necessarily based on an assessment of their ‘enabling environment’ and
can be often questioned from a poverty or development perspective.
Fourth, both an insistence on involving their own private sectors in PSD and the fact
that they all implement very comparable programmes place bilateral donors in
competition with each other. However, multilateral donors also implement many
programmes with similar content, which, sixth, highlights the lack of coordination
between donors generally. There is little current evidence of information-sharing or
even of knowledge of each other’s portfolio. Although this lack of coordination (and the
fact that donors tend to formulate similar programmes) could be regarded as positive as
it provides developing countries with a large reservoir of funding, it also militates
against their ability to obtain an overview and generates a lack of coherence. This, in
turn, makes ownership of PSD by developing countries more difficult. This ‘free
market’ of PSD funding should be questioned. Hopefully, the poverty reduction strategy
route offers a path out of this maze, but probably this will be taken only by countries
applying for HIPC relief, and even in their case the extent to which this is true remains
to be seen.
To sum up, most differences between multilateral and bilateral donors follow from
differences in their organizational objectives (bank lending as such versus broader
forms of assistance) and their ‘ownership’ (international rather than national). It does
not follow from major differences in analytical sophistication or greater reflection on
experience.27
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Annex 1
DAC purposes and their relationship with elements and possible interventions
in the field of private sector development
Purpose Brief description
Direct link to PSD level(s)
and element(s)
Social infrastructrure and services
Education General teaching and instruction at all levels,
construction to improve or adapt educational
establishments, education sector policy and research
Macro: physical and
human capital
Health Health policy, assistance to medical services, health
administration, medical insurance programmes, basic







All activities in the field of reproductive health, family











Aid to strengthen the administrative apparatus and
government planning, activities promoting good
governance and strengthening civil society
Macro: good governance
Other: employment Aid to employment (planning and policy, labour laws,
labour unions, institution capacity building and advice,
employment creation and income generation





Other: housing Aid to housing sector policy, planning and programme




Social legislation and administration, police and




Economic infrastructure and services
Transport and storage Aid to roads, rail, water and air transport and storage Macro: physical and
human capital
Communications Aid to communications (post and telecommunications,















Aid to business development and activities aimed at








Aid to all primary production, agricultural sector policy,
development and inputs, agricultural credit, forestry






DAC purposes and their relationship with elements and possible interventions
in the field of private sector development
Purpose Brief description





Industrial, mining and construction sector policy, small





Trade and tourism Trade and export promotion, trade and tourism policy International
Multisector/cross-cutting Aid to projects which straddle several sectors. Includes
aid to conservation, protection and amelioration of
physical environment without sector allocation and aid
for the advancement of women in development without
sector allocation
na
Commodity aid and general programme service
Structural adjustment
assistance with WB/IMF
Non-sector allocable programme aid whose provision
is explicitly linked to agreed policy packages




Developmental food aid Supplies and transport of food, cash for food, and






Import, budget and balance-of-payments support Macro: macroeconomic
policies
Action relating to debt All actions relating to debt (forgiveness, swaps, buy-
backs, rescheduling, refinancing)
International
Emergency assistance Emergency and distress relief in cash or in kind,
emergency food aid, humanitarian aid including aid to





Support to NGOs Official funds paid over to (inter)national NGOs for use
at the latter’s discretion
na
Unallocated/unspecified Ibid na
Source:  Adapted from DAC (2000: 43-6).
Note: na = not applicable32
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−   Supporting effective governance (technical assistance, policy analysis, training and
scholarships for institutional strengthening, privatization, tax and trade reforms, and effective
legal systems);
−   Strengthening social services and infrastructure (financial and technical aid for education,
health and infrastructure);
−   Facilitating enterprise development (aimed at SMEs, micro-finance, business development
services).
Policy dialogue and studies
Technical assistance and seminars
−   WB SPF: WB South Pacific Facility;
−   PIPS: Pacific Island Private Sector programme.
Vocational and technical training
−   TGS: Training Grants Scheme (short-term training);
−   PIPS: Pacific Island Private Sector programme;
−   TIPS: Trade and Investment Promotion Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (business skills courses);
−   SPTC: South Pacific Trade Commission (technical training).
Technical assistance, training, access to finance
−   AESOP: Australian Executive Service Overseas Programme (volunteer programme);
−   SPPF: IFC South Pacific Project Facility (advisory services project preparation).
BELGIUM
PSCP: Private Sector Cooperation Programme
Objective: to promote relations between small- and medium-sized enterprises, micro-enterprises as
well as partnership arrangements between enterprises through training, financial and technical
support. More specifically, the programme aims at:
−   Technology and know-how transfer via, or in partnership with, Belgian SMEs;
−   The promotion of the emergence of a new generation of heads of enterprises in developing
countries;
−   The creation of joint ventures;
−   Support for small-scale economic initiatives, particularly in countries emerging from conflict
situations;
−   Support structures for micro-enterprises belonging to the social economy sector.
CANADA
Regional and country strategies
Africa
−   MDF: Mahgreb Development Fund (transfer of technology);
−   RSF CEA: Regional Support Fund Central and Eastern Africa;
−   CAPSSA: Canadian Association for the Private Sector in Southern Africa (joint
ventures/licensing arrangements);
−   DCS: Development Programme of Canadian-Senegalese joint ventures (research investment
opportunities, advice + information, studies and project support through CIDA INC funds);
−   Egypt PSD (capacity building public sector, promotion of enabling environment, direct
incentives to private sector, privatization, transfer of technology, collaboration Canadian and
Egyptian private sector);
−   CABBSA: Canadian Association for Black Business in South Africa;
−   Cameroon entrepreneurial support (to ‘enterprise incubators and SMEs, institutional





−   Technology transfer, joint ventures, industrial cooperation at policy and project levels + aid at
institution/organization level and educational institutions level, mostly through partnerships
between Canadian and Asian organizations and institutions);
−   Direct support to micro-enterprise development (examples: Grameen Bank and regional
industrial development programmes);
−   PSDI Fund: Private Sector Development Initiatives Fund (formation of joint ventures and other
forms of collaborative arrangements);
−   ETC: Enterprise Thailand Canada (transfer of technology and expertise through joint
ventures);
−   EMC: Enterprise Malaysia Canada (see ETC);
−   CAC: Canada-ASEAN Centre (human resource development and institutional cooperation,
business cooperation in support of investment and trade, regional public affairs to raise
awareness of Canada in ASEAN countries)
Latin America and the Caribbean
−   Jamaica: export promotion to Canada, training and credit to SMEs, agricultural credits to
cooperative banks, practical technical and entrepreneurial training;
−   South America: lines of credits (particularly to public sector institutions), counterpart funds (to
finance community-based, productive sector initiatives), private sector development fund (to
encourage linkages between Colombian and Canadian firms);
−   CRPSM: Costa Rica Productive Sector Modernization programme (including linkages with
Canadian firms);
−   RISPCA: Regional Initiatives Support Programme in Central America (aimed at improving
effectiveness of governmental and private sector institutions to manage process of economic
modernization).
Canadian Partnership Branch (CPB)
−   Supports efforts of Canadian firms, (international) NGOs, universities, professional
associations and municipalities. Broad range of programmes across whole range from direct
support of PSD through business-to-business joint ventures, investment and technology
transfer, support to micro-enterprises, creation of enabling environment;
−   Direct business-to-business support through INC (Industrial Cooperation) (assistance to
Canadian firms in investment (joint ventures), professional services, and/or specialized
activities;
−   Micro-enterprises support through Canadian and international NGOs (e.g., Women’s World
Banking);
−   Enabling environment support through strengthening pluralistic civil society favouring a
vigorous private sector (e.g., regulatory framework for capital markets, judicial information
systems to improve business dispute resolution system).
Multilateral branch
−   Support to international finance institutions in strengthening capacity of governments to adopt
and sustain sound economic policies through policy dialogue, training, education and research
programmes, lending for infrastructure and sector loans for SMEs;
−   Encouraging regional development banks (RDBs) to use technical aid for sector studies for
formulating and implementing policy reforms, institutional development and public sector
restructuring, including privatization;
−   Support to direct lending facilities of the RDBs (particularly the Asian Development Bank).
DENMARK
−   IFU: Industrial Fund for Developing Countries (provides share capital in joint ventures with
Danish companies and companies in developing countries, pre-investment studies, loans);
−   Investment guarantee system (in connection with Danish’ companies investments in




−   PSD programme (assistance to institutional development of private sector environment,
commercialization and privatization of government-owned enterprises, and business-to-
business cooperation between companies in Denmark and in the recipient country. Aid
granted within these components varies according to situation in country. Includes also various
types of preparatory action, training and education). The main thrust of the PSD programme is
the business-to-business programme, which includes grants for initial investigations, initial
visits, external consultants in drafting project proposal. The PSD programme is restricted to six
developing countries: Egypt, Ghana, India, Uganda, Vietnam and Zimbabwe;
−   TechChange (linked to the PSD programme, offers paid travel and accommodation to
representatives from selected enterprises in the six PSD countries and allows for small
exhibition areas at Danish trade fairs);
−   South African business-to-business programme aims to reinforce and develop the business
opportunities and employment of the target group by supporting the establishment of
collaborations between Danish and South African ‘black-owned’ enterprises; covers expenses
for preliminary studies, training and technology transfers from the Danish partner, and provides
guarantees for investment loans to a limited extent;
−   Mixed credits (in support of the supply of Danish goods and services for development
projects);
−   DIPO: Danish Import Promotion Office for Products from Developing Countries promotes
contacts between exporters from developing countries and Danish importers; arranges, among
other things, visits and seminars;
−   Danced’s Partnership Programme support, comparable to the PSD programme, to enterprises
in Thailand and Malaysia for the development of business ideas in the environmental field,
where Danish environmental know-how or technology can be transferred to Southeast Asia.
FINLAND
Technical cooperation training and trade promotion
−   PRODEC: Programme for Development Cooperation (professional career training in
entrepreneurship and international trade for business executives, specialists, entrepreneurs,
trainers and government officials);
−   FINIPO: Finnish Import Promotion Office for Products from Developing Countries (market
research, information on Finnish business environment, import regulations and General
System of Preference scheme and trade policies);
−   FTP: Forestry Training Programme (forestry sector training including enterprise management
and marketing).
Officially-supported export credits
−   Finnish Export Credit Ltd
Support to project preparation
−   TTT-scheme (allocations for pre-investment and training activities).
Lines of credit
−   Use of a local development finance institution as a conduit for channelling financial assistance
to private enterprises in a certain sector. Only one is a Special Fund Facility in Zambia.
Co-financing to multi-donor programmes
−   Finland contributes to such programmes as the World Bank coordinated African Regional
Programme for Enterprise Development (RPED), and various other capacity and management
building programmes and activities of the World Bank, IFC and other collaborating agencies
for the African region.
Support to SMEs and NGOs
−   Financial arrangements, technology transfer and training within bilateral integrated rural
development and infrastructure projects and programmes. These integrated programmes often
include revolving loan funds for productive and income-generating purposes as well as
activities to improve management and operational skills. Assistance will also be geared at
formation of associations of business, employees and farmers, and improvements in general




Policy measures aimed at strengthening institutional partners;
Developing networks of private enterprises through forging links with and between chambers of
commerce, employers’ associations. Can include technical assistance through personnel of
volunteer workers VSNE), cooperation at local level and mechanisms, which allow French regional
authorities to provide support to firms operating in Africa (guarantee funds, venture capital
companies, etc.);
Action aimed at small and micro-enterprises
−   AIPB credits (Aid for Basic Productive Initiatives) through CFD: Caisse Française de
Développement (loans to support creation and development of such enterprises);
−   Local loan schemes (operated by CFD and Ministry of Cooperation).
Instruments used by CFD to provide funding to the private sector
−   PROPARCO (subsidiary of CFD, finance company, loans to assist in the creation of new firms,
restructuring of existing firms and asset purchases in the event of privatization);
−   CFD: providing loans where PROPARCO cannot provide;
−   ARIA: Assurance du Risque des Investissements en Afrique (venture capital insurance);
−   FGAO: Fonds de Garantie d’Afrique de l’Ouest (credit guarantees for banks that finance
medium and long-term investment in private sector firms;
−   Joint venture funds (feasibility studies, audits, joint ventures, training programmes.
GERMANY
Private-public partnership
Basically this is the name under which most of Germany’s bilateral PSD programme related to
German companies is known. It covers a range of different interventions which all depart from the
fact that the costs are shared by the German government and the (German) private sector together.
Financially supported activities falling under the PPP are:
−   Technical, sector and project studies (institutions involved KfW, GTZ and DEG);
−   Pilot projects (DEG and GTZ);
−   Investment projects (DEG);
−   Technical training in developing countries or Germany (GTZ, DEG and CDG);
−   Experts (SES and CIM);
−   Joint ventures (SEQUA).
Below is an overview of PSD programmes from the 1995 DAC survey. At that time, the concept of
PPP was not operational.
−   Technical cooperation/advisory services and training;
−   Policy dialogue (state level);
−   Policy advice agreement (state level);
−   Advisory services to governments and administrations (state level);
−   Advisory services for institutions working in trades and crafts, SMEs, export, technology,
investment in joint ventures, chambers of commerce and business credit guarantee fund
associations, twinning;
−   Arrangements, financial institutions, savings banks and cooperatives, development of
vocational commercial training, management centres (intermediary/APEX institutions level);
−   Institution building (intermediary/APEX institutions level);
−   Federal Ministry for Research and Technology: technology transfer (intermediary/APEX
institutions level);
−   Twinning arrangements with the federal states (chambers of commerce) (intermediary/APEX
institution level);
−   Promotion of companies (company level);





−   Financial cooperation funds for physical and social infrastructure, mixed financing, commodity
aid and/or structural adjustment programmes (state level);
−   Financial cooperation for banks (credit lines for the private sector) (intermediary/APEX
institutions level);
−   DEG: German finance company for investment in developing countries (funds-in-trust)
(intermediary/APEX institutions level).
Foreign trade promotion
−   Investment guarantee agreement (state level);
−   Double taxation agreement (state level);
−   General customs preferences for developing countries GATT (state level);
−   Joint economic missions (state level);
−   German Chambers of Commerce abroad, BfAI (Federal Agency for Foreign Trade
Information), Associations or specific regions (company level);
−   Export guarantees, business services at the embassies (company level);
−   ‘The promotion of German exports to developing countries’ (company level).
Multilateral development cooperation
−   World Bank, IMF, MIGA, IDA, IFC (state level);
−   Regional development banks (state level);
−   ILO, UNDP, UNIDO (intermediary/APEX institutions level);
−   European Commission (intermediary/APEX institutions level);
−   Centre for Industrial Development (company level);
−   UNIDO-IPS (companies level);
−   IFC (companies level).
ITALY
−   Small and medium-sized enterprises rehabilitation programmes;
−   Technical and financial assistance (partly through local financial systems);
−   Participation in the privatization process;
−   Joint ventures;
−   Concessional loans to Italian companies as part of their quota or risk capital;
−   Development cooperation scheme for the promotion of local enterprises;
−   International partnership, such as trading, marketing and co-production agreements,
franchising and production licensing agreements backed by managerial and technical
assistance by Italian SMEs;
−   Policy dialogues with recipient countries;
−   Special (country level) reports.
JAPAN
Direct approach to private sector promotion
−   Technical cooperation between governments through JICA ([Japan International Cooperation
Agency] facilities and equipment for vocational training, experts and receiving trainees);
−   Private sector technical cooperation (training of workers, dispatching of experts to private
enterprises in developing countries. AOTS [Association of Overseas Technical Scholarship
provides training and JODC [Japan Overseas Development Corporation] takes care of experts;
−   Two-step loans (loans to the private sector via financial institutions in developing countries);
−   Promotion of exports from developing countries (via JETRO [Japan External Trade
Organization] through trade missions, advice on product quality, technology transfer and
research and information provision);
Indirect approach to private sector promotion
−   Establishment of appropriate economic and social infrastructure (mainly through loans for




−   Government technical cooperation (transfer of know-how on capacity building and institution
building, i.e. taxation, finance, industrial standardization, intellectual property through dialogue
and experts);
−   Promotion of imports from developing countries (in Japan) (through import missions,
exhibitions, trade seminars, information via JETRO);
−   Promotion of investment in developing countries (trade insurance and soft loans by Export-
Import Bank of Japan, and promotion of investment in joint ventures by JAIDO [Japan




−   Support to micro- and small-scale enterprises;
−   Support to structural adjustment programmes which are aimed at the creation of the
macroeconomic and monetary conditions, and the legal and regulatory framework for PSD;
−   Support to the creation and safeguarding of the conditions for the effective operation of free
markets (including privatization as a means to further the efficiency of the national economy).
Provision of rural infrastructure
−   Reinforcement of the educational system;
−   Institutional development activities;
−   Matchmaking and information services for Dutch companies.
More specific
−   FMO: Netherlands Development Finance Company (loans and equity for small- and medium-
scale private enterprises either directly or through local banks and other financial institutions);
−   KB: Small-scale enterprise funding programme under FMO (financial assistance in local
currency to small enterprises);
−   SC: Seed capital programme under FMO (financial participation in starting enterprises,
particularly in Africa);
−   IFOM: Investeringsfaciliteit Opkomende Markten (loans to joint ventures by Dutch companies);
−   IBTA: Investment promotion and technical assistance (via FMO, grants or concessional loans
for management advice and technical assistance to promote investment and business
performance);
−   NMCP/PUM: Netherlands Management Consultancy Programme/Programma Uitzending
Managers (sending out experienced advisors in the technical and management fields to small-
and medium-sized companies);
−   RHI: Regeling Herverzekering Investeringen (insurance for specific political risks for
investments by Dutch companies);
−   POPM: Garantieregeling Particuliere Ontwikkelings Participatie Maatschappijen (guarantees
for commercial risks with investments by Dutch development participation companies);
−   CBI: Centre for the promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (through market
information, trade fairs, support to exporters);
−   PESP: Programma Economische Samenwerkingsprojecten (financing of feasibility studies for
trade and investment relations);
−   PSO: Programma Samenwerking Oost-Europa and PSOM—Programma Samenwerking
Opkomende Markten (supporting trade and/or investments by Dutch companies by setting up
local firms through financial assistance);
−   NIMF: Netherlands’s Investerings Matching Fonds (comparable to IFOM);
−   ORET/Miliev: Ontwikkelingsrelevante Export Transacties/Milieu en Economische
Verzelfstandiging (financial support for non-commercially viable local investments requiring
Dutch goods and services with the aim of strengthening the local infrastructure);
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Country and programmes
THE NETHERLANDS (con’t)
−   NCM: Nederlandse Credietverzekerings Maatschappij (insurance against commercial and
political risks in the case of exports or investments);
−   GOM: Garantiefaciliteit Opkomende Markten (insurance scheme for transactions following
from the ORET/Miliev programme).
Multilateral channels
−   World Bank and regional banks;
−   IFC, MIGA, FIAS;
−   UNIDO, ILO;
−   AMSCO, APDF, RPED;
−   EIB;
−   Micro credit (WWB and CGAP).
NEW ZEALAND
−   Policy dialogue with developing countries;
−   Encouragement of local firms to compete for all contracts for (bilateral) aid;
−   Technical assistance for export, trade and foreign investment promotion in consultation with
SPTC;
−   Agricultural extension services;
−   Technical assistance to improve quarantine procedures and facilities;
−   Market development studies;
−   Assistance to rural credit schemes and cooperatives (often via NGOs);
−   Advice for state sector reform (e.g., privatization, corporatization, economic restructuring,
taxation regimes, management State-owned enterprises);
−   Technical assistance and in-country training in small business development;
−   PIIDS: Pacific Islands Industrial Development Scheme (grants towards feasibility studies,
capital set-up costs for activities in partnership with New Zealand enterprises promoting New
Zealand investment);
−   DAFs: Development assistance facilities (responsibility for identifying and formulating
proposals lies with the proposing (New Zealand) companies and individuals, used for (pre-)
feasibility studies, project appraisal and design, training, pre-investment studies);
−   Private sector assistance through (i) through assistance to the individual entrepreneur in the
form of capital  grants or loans, technical advice, and business training; (ii) strengthening
institutions and organizations which serve the entrepreneurs e.g., human resource
development, operating funds; (iii) economic policy and public sector reform; and/or (iv) social
policy and infrastructural development;
−   VASS: Voluntary agencies support scheme (support to PSD through NGOs).
NORWAY
Multilateral channel
−   Participation in international negotiations;
−   Active participation in the governing bodies of individual organizations to influence the
organizations’ general policies and strategies;
−   Participation in and support for special programmes and coordinating mechanisms;
−   Assistance to developing countries to enable them to participate actively in relevant
international organizations themselves;
−   Financial support to activities of multilateral organizations in individual countries;
Bilateral channel
−   Dialogue concerning priorities and policy;
−   Direct support to individual projects and programmes within infrastructure, capacity building





−   NORFUND (direct supply of capital for investments through joint ventures between enterprises
in Norway and enterprises in developing countries);
−   GIEK: Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Export Credits (guarantee scheme for exports to and
investments in developing countries by Norwegian companies).
NGO channel
−   Income generating projects;
−   Support to micro-finance schemes.
PORTUGAL
FCE: Fund for Economic Cooperation;
Support to Portuguese direct investment and trade-related projects aimed at development through
−   Grants for feasibility studies, technical assistance and professional training;
−   Interest subsidies for loans to finance development-related investments or projects;
−   Grants for important and strategic projects;
−   Encouragement of joint ventures;
OICT: Organization for Investments, Commerce and Tourism (technical assistance in the fields of
commerce and investments with the aim of promoting economic relations between Portuguese and
African enterprises);
COSEC: Companhia de Seguros de Créditos (insurance scheme for export credits and investments).
SWEDEN
SwedeCorp (aid authority formed to promote a favourable business environment and sustainable
profitable enterprises in developing countries and Eastern Europe) provides aid within three main
areas:
Competence development in trade and industry
−   Training, institutional support, industrial environment protection with emphasis on involvement
of Swedish private companies and institutions).
Business development
−   Information, advice, market research, business contracts, import guarantee schemes,
promotion of joint ventures and alliances for exporters and Swedish importers).
Provision of risk capital
−   Loans and equity investments through investment banks, venture capital funds, leasing
companies and other specialized local financial institutions in order to promote investments
and improve financial strength of small- and medium-scale companies in developing countries,
equity participation mostly in cooperation with Swedfund International AB, technical assistance
for development of financial markets, support to privatization projects, investment seminars.
Interventions at macro-level
−   (Co)financing of structural and sectoral adjustment programmes;
−   (Co)financing of debt reduction programmes;
−   Support of international networks, coordination and policy dialogue mechanisms;
−   Commercial policy measures for PSD, e.g. double taxation treaties, investment protection
treaties, investment insurance or guarantees;
−   Policy dialogue at international and local levels.
Interventions at meso-level
−   Promotion of institutions actively involved in private sector promotion, e.g. in fields such as
finance, banking, professional training, advisory and consultancy services in technical and
managerial aspects;





Support to small-scale enterprise promotion programmes;
Support to and promotion of self-help groups and associations at entrepreneurial level;
Promotion of collaboration between enterprises south-south/north-south (investment promotion,
facilitating business linkages, joint ventures);
Promotion of technology transfer and local technology development;
Export promotion from developing countries.
UNITED KINGDOM
Correcting policy fundamentals
−   Programme aid in support of structural adjustment supported by technical cooperation (aimed
at macroeconomic stabilization, adopting realistic exchange rates, sound public finance, price
liberalization and liberalizing’ investment).
Helping markets work more efficiently
−   Technical cooperation and consultancy mainly in context of structural adjustment programmes
(aimed at financial sector reform, company law reform, new rules for capital markets, removing
legal and regulatory barriers to entry and labour mobility).
Helping design promotional and confidence-building measures
−   Technical cooperation and policy dialogue (in/for investment promotion, establishing
investment assistance and promotion services).
Support for CDC (Commonwealth Development Corporation) investment and lending activities
−   Investments in profit-making enterprises.
Help for small and micro-enterprises
−   Financial, technical and training services (often via NGOs).
Direct help, outside normal government-to-government channels, for selected enterprises
−   Technical cooperation grants (often with a cost-sharing or cost-recovery element) for the
formal private sector or (preferably) organizations representing them, in the form of training in




−   Financial and technical support for policy reform and structural adjustment policies in close
cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF.
Individual and sectoral topics
Financial markets development
−   Trade and investment promotion (with focus on long-term private enterprise ties).
Privatization, and private provision of social services: (through contacts with)
−   CFP: Centre for Privatization;
−   IPG: International Privatization Group providing technical and advisory services with focus on
design, preparation and implementation of privatization transactions);
−   Micro-enterprise development (also through NGOs);
−   CEG: Center for Economic Growth (technical support to USAID missions, management of
USAID’s loan and guarantee programme, developing programmes in areas of economics,
agriculture, business development, micro-enterprise development, and financial markets
development).
−   OPIC: Overseas Private Investment Corporation (political risks insurance, loans, guarantees,
equity, etc. to US business to invest and compete in emerging markets and developing
countries
Sources: DAC (1995: 31-110, 1997a and 1997b); Van den Bosch (1998); DGIS (2000); NORAD (1999);
BMZ (Folder over PPP); NZODA (1991), CIDA (1999), Sida (1997), AusAID (2000); Danida
(1999).41
Annex 3



















−   260 active Bank projects (in March 2001) with substantial PSD components. 60 projects
classified as PSD projects. The rest are categorized under other sectoral or thematic heads.
Interventions fall into four categories
(i) Improvements in the investment climate aim to enhance deregulation and competition by
ensuring a legal and regulatory framework that encourages competitive provision of goods
and services, property rights and corporate governance, and development of institutions
related to PSD;
  (ii) Privatization and concession-type arrangements include management contracts, leases,
concessions, build-operate-and-transfer (BOTs) operations and outright divestiture;
(iii) Direct assistance to enterprises includes lines of credit to financial institutions which then
on-lend to private companies, provision of technical assistance such as business advisory
services, matching grants facilities, project financing facilities for infrastructure projects and
guarantees;
(iv) Social funds typically support small projects in infrastructure, social services, training and
micro-credit. They support the PSD agenda by developing alternative, non-governmental
delivery mechanisms.
IBRD/IDA adjustment lending
−   Adjustment lending programmes support the implementation of a number of key measures to
strengthen the investment climate. These measures focus on competition policies and
strengthening competitiveness through (i) regulatory reform; (ii) improving logistics and
reducing transaction costs; (iii) strengthening inter-firm linkages and government-business
consultations, and (iv) supporting global integration through institutional and policy reforms for
greater export orientation, corporate governance and foreign direct investment.
International Finance Corporation (IFC)
−   IFC’s traditional and largest activity is to finance private sector projects in developing
countries. IFC provides loans, equity finance and quasi-equity. It also offers financial risk
management products and intermediary finance;
−   IFC investments go to a variety of sectors. About two-thirds were concentrated in three
sectors: financial sector, which includes financial services and collective investment vehicles,
infrastructure and manufacturing. IFC’s latest strategy signalled a change in its strategic
focus. It calls for a move towards areas with high multiplier effects, i.e., whose impact goes
well beyond the capital investment. It calls for increased intervention in frontier countries (high
risk/low-income countries with very limited access to foreign capital and/or undeveloped
domestic financial markets) and in frontier regions or sectors within other countries. Five
sectors of emphasis were identified: domestic financial institutions, infrastructure, information
technology and communications, SMEs and the social sectors (health and education).
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
−   MIGA provides investment guarantees against certain non-commercial risks (i.e., political risk
insurance) to eligible foreign investors for qualified investments in developing member
countries. MIGA’s coverage is against the following risks: Transfer restriction; expropriation;
breach of contract; and war and civil disturbance.
Non-financial activities
−   The World Bank Group is involved in a wide range of non-lending activities related to PSD
issues. The most important of such activities being advisory services (to governments, private
sector institutions and firms), economic and sector work, research and training. Arbitration,
standard setting and ratings have emerged as an important area in recent years.
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP)
−   World Bank in association with a number of bilateral donors is a founding member of CGAP.
CGAP is a consortium of 29 bilateral and multilateral donor agencies who support micro-
finance. Its mission is to improve the capacity of micro-finance institutions to deliver flexible,
high-quality financial services to the very poor on a sustainable basis;
−   CGAP serves micro-finance institutions, donors and the micro-finance industry through the
development of technical tools and services, the delivery of training, strategic advice and
































AsDB products for private sector projects:
Loans
−   AsDB uses hard currency loans (without government guarantee) to support private
enterprises and financial institutions.
Equity
−   AsDB uses equity investments to directly support private enterprises, private equity funds,
and financial institutions;
−   Complementary financing schemes (CFS);
−   CFS loans are available for private sector projects in which AsDB is a direct participant. ADB
acts as ‘lender of record’ and provides loan administration services. CFS loans are funded by
commercial lenders, such as banks and insurance companies.
Partial credit guarantees (PCGs)
−   The PCG provides comprehensive cover for a specific portion of the commercial debt
provided by co-financiers. PCGs are generally used for projects needing long-term funds.
PCGs suit specific developing member countries: those considered to be creditworthy,
though they have restricted access to financial markets.
Political risk guarantees (PRG)
−   The PRG programme of the AsDB is designed to facilitate commercial cofinancing by
providing lenders to an AsDB-assisted project with cover against specifically defined political
risks.
Export credit agency (ECA) co-financing
−   Support from ECAs can provide a significant extra source of cover to commercial
cofinanciers. The mandate of most ECAs is to fill a ‘gap’ and cover the risks that the
commercial market will not. To tap this very important source of cover, AsDB acts as
coordinator between all parties: the project sponsor or arranging bank, and the participating
ECAs and international financial institutions.






































The AfDB Group consists of three institutions: the African Development Bank, the African
Development Fund and the Nigeria Trust Fund.
The focus of the AfDB Group private sector assistance is in areas which portend long-term
development prospects for the private sector in Africa, such as advisory services, infrastructure
financing, privatization and small and medium size enterprises.
Type of bank investments
−   Loans: The Bank offers term loans;
−   Equity and quasi-equity: Bank equity investments may take a variety of forms, including
common shares and preferred stock, with or without participating features;
−   Guarantees: The Bank extends its guarantee to cover the payment of principal and of interest
for loans extended by others. The beneficiary of the Bank’s guarantees, i.e. the funding
source, may be local or foreign financial institutions, commercial firms and individual
investors;
−   Lines of credit: The Bank offers lines of credit to private financial institutions for on-lending to
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Details of sub-loans are submitted to the Bank for
review before approval by the financial institution to ascertain that the loan compiles with
Bank policies. The credit risks of the subloans are borne by the financial institutions;
−   Loan syndications: Syndications may involve the Bank acting as arranger of financing or
involve arrangements whereby banks and other financial institutions are offered participation
in a Bank loan with the banks, taking the same project risk as the Bank on a pro-rata basis;
−   Underwriting. The Bank can act as an underwriter of a portion of the securities issued by
private sector entities and by country or regional investment funds.
The Nigeria Trust Fund
The Nigeria Trust Fund was established by the government of Nigeria in 1976. The purpose of the
NTF is to assist in the development efforts of the poorer ADB members. The NTF is under AfDB
management and, as at 31 December 1996, had a total resource base of US$ 432 million. It lends
at a 4 per cent interest rate, with a 25-year repayment period, including a five year grace period.








































Structured and corporate finance lending
−   Project finance basis: Loans can be made on a project finance basis. This structure is
particularly useful for new or ‘greenfield’ operations, where a special purpose company is
generally established to build, own, operate and act as borrower for the project with limited
recourse to sponsors during the project completion and/or operation stage;
−   Corporate finance basis: Loans are also structured on a corporate finance basis, most
typically required for expansions and modernization of the existing productive capacity of a
corporation, and often for privatized public utility companies.
Political risk and credit guarantees
−   In addition to loans, the IDB also provides credit and political risk guarantees to private sector
lenders seeking coverage for their loans to projects.
Capital markets initiatives
−   Debt financing and/or guarantees to regional or national investment funds to mobilize venture
capital equity resources  and/or debt capital that  are otherwise not commonly available to
private sector projects or other long-term capital investments. These funds may be invested
in projects that develop infrastructure or expand the long-term capacity of other productive
sectors;
−   Debt financing and/or guarantees for funds, leasing companies or other financial
intermediaries. This support is designed to enhance the efficiency of financial intermediaries,
to generate additional sources of long-term local currency funding;
−   Start-up debt financing and/or guarantees for local companies that guarantee locally-issued
private sector debt. The IDB seeks to enhance the local company’s ability to mobilize funds
for private sector projects and capital-intensive productive sectors, to further develop the
secondary markets of those debt obligations;
−   Guarantees for local institutions, such as investment banks, commercial banks and leasing
companies, to allow them to securitize assets and to develop a medium-term corporate
debenture market that will facilitate the channelling of long-term, local currency financing;
−   Co-lending arrangements with local financial institutions and institutional investors that have a
developmental impact on the   domestic capital market’s long-term financing capabilities.
Since the IDB does not provide risk capital, it does not participate in the equity of investment
funds or individual companies. 
Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC)
−   The IIC’s developmental financing programme targets small- and medium-sized private
companies in Latin America and the Caribbean that have limited access to long-term
financing, through loans and equity investments.
The Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF)
−   Market functioning;
−   Regulatory framework; facilitation of trade and investment; labour market modernization;
−   Financial and capital markets;
−   Market transparency measures; regulatory reform and supervision; capital market
development;
−   Small business development;
−   Streamlining regulations; innovative business relationship; eco-efficiency; quality
management; financing options; information technologies; skills standards and credentialing;
−   Micro-enterprise;
−   Innovation partnerships; regulatory and supervisory framework; strengthening micro-finance
institutions.





























The Bank’s private sector operations focus primarily on assistance to:
−   Financial intermediaries involved in leasing, Islamic banking, mutual funds and insurance;
−   Infrastructure projects such as power, water supply, transport and telecommunications
sectors; and
−   Industrial, agro-business and other projects which have significant economic merit.
IDB support is provided directly to private enterprises and financial institutions through lines of
instalment sale and leasing, investment in equity securities, co-financing in trade finance, and
export credit and investment guarantees.
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Types of support
CDB makes or participates in direct loans to private entities and enterprises. CDB makes direct or




































Permanent discussion between donors and governments on content and timing of measures for
further liberalizing’ and deregulating the economy, reducing the size of the public sector, and
creating  enabling environment (e.g., macroeconomic factors [taxation, prices], price controls,
dismantling of entry and exit barriers, tax reforms, property rights, etc.).
Financial instruments
−   ECIP: European Community Investment Partners (financial backing for joint ventures
(particularly SMEs) at various points in project’s development through subsidies, participatory
loans, equity participations, interest-free advances);
−   EIB: European Investment Bank (venture capital);
−   EDF: European Development Fund (opening credit lines to local SME financing institutions);
−   Import programmes (used to fund imports of intermediate products by ACP export industries);
−   Counterpart funds (used to finance farm loans, job creation programmes, etc.).
Technical assistance
−   CID: Centre for Industrial Development (technical or economic feasibility studies for industrial
projects, seeking out EC partners for ACP-EC joint ventures) (technical assistance, joint
ventures, subcontracting, licensing).
General
−   Studies, experts, training, dissemination of information, investor forums, technology transfer.
Instruments for creating contacts between enterprises
−   Europartenariat, Med Partenariat or enterprise meetings;
−   BCC: Business Cooperation Centre (Mediterranean);
−   BC-NET: Business Cooperation Network (Latin America and Asia);
−   COOPECO network (Latin America) (networks for tracing possible partners);
−   Information;
−   MED-INVEST (Mediterranean) and ALL-INVEST (Latin America) (information clearing-

















































t The EBRD finances projects in the private sector. The Bank also finances infrastructure projects
that support the private sector. In addition, it supports privatization, restructures state-owned firms
and improves municipal services.
Many projects are too small to be funded directly by the EBRD. To give entrepreneurs and small
firms greater access to finance, the EBRD supports financial intermediaries, such as local
commercial banks, micro-business banks, equity funds and leasing facilities.
The Bank supports trade facilitation through guarantees for import and export-related transactions,
as well as financing to banks for on-lending to traders.
The EBRD also supports several business development programmes. Programmes include the
TurnAround Management Programme, business advisory services, Joint Vienna Institute seminars
and the MBA loan programme.
EBRD is a donor agency member of CGAP.45
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Abbreviations
AsDB Asian Development Bank
AfDB African Development Bank
ARIA Assurance de Risque des Investissements en Afrique (France)
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
CABBSA Canadian Association for Black Business in South Africa.
CAC Canada-ASEAN Centre
CAPSSA Canadian Association for the Private Sector in Southern Africa
CBI Centre for the promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (the
Netherlands)
CDB Caribbean Development Bank
CDC Commonwealth Development Corporation
CDG Carl-Duisburg-Gesellschaft e.V. (Germany)
CEG Center for Economic Growth (United States)
CFP Center for Privatization (United States)
CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest
CID Centre for Industrial Development (EU)
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CIM Centrum für Internationale Migration und Entwicklung (Germany)
CRPSM Costa Rica Productive Sector Modernization programme (Canada)
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DAFs Development Assistance Facilities (New Zealand)
DCS Development programme of Canadian-Senegalese joint ventures
DEG Deutsche Investions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (Germany)
DGIS Directoraat-Generaal Internationale Samenwerking (the Netherlands)
DIPO Danish Import Promotion Office for Products from Developing
Countries
EC European Commission
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECIP European Community Investment Partners
EDF European Development Fund
EIB European Investment Bank
ETC Enterprise Thailand Canada
EU European Union
FISA Foreign Investment Advisory Service46
FMO Financiering Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden (the Netherlands)
FY Fiscal year
GIEK Guarantee Institute for Export Credits (Norway)
GOM Garantiefaciliteit Opkomende Markten (the Netherlands)
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
IADB Inter-American Development Bank
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IBTA Investment promotion and technical assistance (the Netherlands)
ICDPS Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector
IDA International Development Association
IsDB Islamic Development Bank
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFOM Investeringsfaciliteit Opkomende Markten (the Netehrlands)
IFU Industrial Fund for Developing Countries (Denmark)
IIC Inter-American Investment Corporation
ILO International Labour Office
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPG International Privatization Group (United States)
KfW Kredietanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Germany)
LDCs Least developed countries
MDF Mahgreb Development Fund (Canada)
MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
NCM Nederlandse Credietverzekerings Maatschappij (the Netherlands)
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NIMF Nederlands Investerings Matching Fonds
NMCP  Netherlands Management Consultancy Programme (the Netherlands)
NORAD Norwegian International Development Agency
NORFUND Norwegian Risk Capital Fund for Developing Countries
NZODA New Zealand Official Development Assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OA Official assistance
ODA Official development assistance
OOF Other official flows
ORET/Miliev Ontwikkelingsrelevante Export Transacties/Milieu en Economische
Verzelfstandiging (the Netherlands)
PESP Programma Economische Samenwerkingsprojecten (the Netherlands)47
PIIDS Pacific Islands Industrial Development Scheme (New Zealand)
POPM Garantieregeling Particuliere Ontwikkelings Participatie Maatschappijen
(the Netherlands)
PROPARCO Société de Promotion et de Participation pour la Coopération
Economique (France)
PSD Private sector development
PSDI Fund Private Sector Development Initiative Fund (Canada)
PSO Programma Samenwerking Oost-Europa (the Netherlands)
PSOM Programma Samenwerking Opkomende Markten (the Netherlands)
PUM Programma Uitzending Managers (the Netherlands)
RHI Regeling Herverzekering Investeringen (the Netherlands)
R&D Research & Development
RISPCA Regional Initiatives Support Programme in Central America (Canada)
RSF CEA Regional Support Fund Central and Eastern Africa (Canada)
SES Senior Experten Service (Germany)
SEQUA Stiftung für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und berufliche Qualifizierung
(Germany)
SME Small- and medium-sized enterprise
SOE State-owned enterprise
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Programme
VASS Voluntary Agencies Support Scheme (New Zealand)
WB World Bank
WTO World Trade Organization